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FAMILY LAW
by
Joseph W. McKnight*

E IGHT years after enactment of the first increment of large scale family law
recodification and revision, the 1975 amendments to the Family Code
completed the statutory reform. With its rule-making power the Supreme
Court of Texas joined the legislature in simplifying the process for settlement
of disputes involving missing persons and non-residents. But in one striking
instance our highest court has seemingly interpreted the legislative restatement of marital property law in a way that may give marital property
management law a new direction.
The bar, which began to certify its members as family law specialists, was
provided with a newly packaged compendium of authorities, still sailing
under the colors of Speer. As state law develops in its inexorable way, one
senses the probability of substantial federal encroachment in the field of
family law as a result of the enactment of the Social Services Amendments
Act of 1974 and the seeming willingness of the federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction in those matters from which they have so long abstained.
I.

A.

SPOUSES

Status

After much hesitation to treat the matter forthrightly, rationally, and
practically,' the legislature accepted the carefully considered recommendation
of the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Texas to reinstate the age of
fourteen as the minimum age of marriage for females and to extend it to
males. 2 Fourteen was the minimum age for females from 1866 through
1969,3 when legislative uncertainty set in. 4' The new legislation makes
parental consent a prerequisite to issuance of a new marriage license to
* B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. McKnight, Commentary to the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX. TEcH L.
REV. 281, 295-98 (1974).
2. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.52 (Supp. 1975-76).
3. Ch. 76, § 1, [1866) Tex. Laws 72, 5 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TExAs 990 (1898).
From 1837 to 1866 the minimum age for marriage for females was 12 and the minimum
age for males was 14. In 1866 the minimum ages were changed to 14 and 16,
respectively.
4. Much of the legislative hesitation in this regard was prompted by discussion and
dispute with respect to codification and perpetuation of the principle of informal
marriage.
The pre-1969 age disparity for males and females would no longer stand under the
Equal Rights Amendment. TEx. CONsT. art. 1, § 3a. See, e.g., Texas Women's Univ. v.
Chayklintaste, 521 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), rev'd on other grounds,
530 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1975).
In Chayklintaste the court of civil appeals held
that a state university's policy refusing off-campus living privileges to females under age
23 violated the amendment. See also Blumberg, Book Review, 53 TExAs L. REV. 1354
(1975).
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persons of either sex between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, 5 and absent
parental consent, judicial consent to marry may now be granted to such
persons, and even to those below the age of fourteen."
The legislature also amended those sections of the Family Code dealing
with the marriage licensing process to conform to those with respect to age
of marriage, and added additional provisions so that formal remarriage
could not be achieved within thirty days of judicial dissolution of a prior
marriage. 7 Section 1.86 of the Family Code was added in 1975 to give
statutory authorization for issuance of a duplicate returned and recorded
license to persons whose marriage is so evidenced. 8 It had been the practice
in many counties to issue a duplicate license when the returned and recorded
license had been lost or destroyed. This section also allows parties to a
marriage performed pursuant to a valid license which was not recorded
following the ceremony to acquire a duplicate license by submitting to the
county clerk proof of their identity and an affidavit stating that as recipients
of the original license they were married by a person authorized to conduct a
ceremony as provided in section 1.83, the name of that person, and the date
on which the ceremony was conducted. Both parties to a marriage must
apply for the duplicate license under this section.9
With respect to the law of marriage, judicial activity was most marked in
considering comparative validity of successive marriages. The rule is succinctly stated in the Family Code that a subsequent marriage is presumed to
be valid in relation to an earlier one until the continued validity of the earlier
marriage is proved. 10 If, of course, the validity of the earlier marriage is
proved, the subsequent marriage may still be putative as long as the party
claiming thereunder is in good faith unaware of impediments to its validi5. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.51-.52 (Supp. 1975-76).
6. Id. §§ 1.51-.53. In 1973 judicial consent to marry was made available for
persons under 16. Ch. 577, § 7, [1973] Tex. Laws 1600. In 1975 § 1.52 and 1.53
were amended and simplified to conform to the changes in age and judicial and parental
consent as provided in § 1.51. The changes include a provision affording a child the
ability to petition for judicial consent and to an "early hearing" without a jury. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.53(a), (f) (Supp. 1975-76). The second sentence was added to
subsection (d) to provide for single publication in cases of citation by publication in
order to conform with similar provisions in H§ 3.26, 3.521, 11.05, and 11.051. This
change was made to make the rule of publication consistent with that in § 11.05, for the
overall purpose of reducing the extent of effort involved in a purposeless exercise (except
for jurisdictional purposes) and to reduce costs. Regrettably, the last purpose has not
been achieved.
Section 2.41 was amended to conform to the provisions of § 1.51, 1.52, and 1.53.
7. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.07(a) (7) (Supp. 1975-76). This section was added
in response to TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-581 (1975) expressing the view that a
license might be issued by a clerk under then-prevailing law if the wedding date were set
more than 30 days following a divorce of a person seeking the license, although the
license was sought during the 30-day period. The objective is to insure compliance with
§ 3.66, previously sought to be achieved in a different form by the 1969 version of §
1.07(c). See TEX. ATr'y GEN. Op. Nos. M-768 (1971), M-604 (1970). The provisions
of the Code dealing with an absent applicant for a license to marry were also amended to
avoid circumvention of § 3.66. TEX. F.m. CODE ANN. § 1.05(c)(2) (Supp. 1975-76).
8. TaX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.86 (Supp. 1975-76).
9. Although it seems widely believed that the provisions of § 3.66 may still be
circumvented by entry into an informal marriage within 30 days of judicial dissolution of
a prior marriage, that view is clearly contrary to § 3.66 itself. See McKnight,
Commentary to the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX. TEcH L. REV. 281, 343 (1974).
10. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.01 (1975).
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ty. 11 In Wood v. Paulus'2 it was disputed whether the first of two
marriages was dissolved by divorce, and whether the second was entered into
either formally or informally. The court concluded that the facts were
sufficient to permit the question of the validity of the second marriage to go
to a jury and to shift the burden to the proponent of the first marriage to
demonstrate its continued existence. A somewhat similar dispute was before
the court in Rosetta v. Rosetta1 where the husband petitioned for dissolution of an alleged informal marriage. The alleged wife denied the existence
of any marriage to dissolve, as she had, subsequent to cohabitation with the
petitioning husband, contracted a ceremonial marriage with another. The
court noted that a later marriage is presumed valid until the validity of the
prior marriage is proved, but went on to state that "the presumption of
validity of a ceremonial marriage is stronger than that of a previous common
*...
,,4 This proliferation of presumptions was unneceslaw marriage .
5
sary' and should not be taken out of context to suggest that any formal
6
marriage has a presumption of validity superior to any informal marriage.'
.In Felsenthal v. McMillan 7 the supreme court concluded that criminal
conversation constitutes a cause of action in Texas. By way of obiter dictum
the court then stated that a wife has a right of action to recover on this
ground as well as the husband-a conclusion equally applicable to recovery
8
for alienation of affection or loss of consortium.'1 In Felsenthal the court
stated that in an action for criminal conversation the "aggrieved spouse is
surely injured whether or not the affections of the conversing spouse have
been alienated," thereby making it clear that criminal conversation and
9
The court also
alienation of affection are independent causes of action.'
pointed out that in addition to adultery, "rape is included in the tort of
criminal conversation. ' 20 Hence, by adding a provision to the Family
Code2 ' abolishing the tort of criminal conversation, both aspects of the tort
(in favor of the non-participating spouse) have been abolished. However,
the tort of alienation of affection was unaffected in spite of the fact that the
11. Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975), discussed in McKnight, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67-68 (1975).

12. 524 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
13. 525 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ).

14. Id. at 261.
15. The petitioner in Rosetta failed to prove the three elements of an informal
marriage. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(a) (1975); see Flavin v. Flavin, 523 S.W.2d 94
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
16. Any argument that a prior ceremonial marriage has presumptive validity over a
later informal marriage is contrary to TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.01 (1975). Spouses
may record an informal marriage in spite of a subsequent ceremonial marriage. See

McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 68 (1975). The

Family Code also authorizes issuance of a license for a ceremonial marriage to persons

already informally married. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.07(b) (1975).
17. 493 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1973), commented on in McKnight, Family Law, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66-67 (1974).

18. In Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974), the wife was allowed
recovery for loss of consortium; the court's opinion was founded upon the Pennsylvania
Equal Rights Amendment, PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27. In admiralty there may be no cause
of action for loss of consortium for the wife of an injured seaman. Francis v. Pan Am.
Trinidad Oil Co., 392 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Del. 1975).

19. 493 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex. 1973).
20. Id.
21. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.05 (Supp. 1975-76).
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caption of the added section seems to indicate that result.2 2 The Code
Construction Act provides that "section captions do not limit or expand the
meaning of any statute, '23 and the soundness of this rule is demonstrated in
this instance.
With respect to the existing causes of action for loss of consortium and
alienation of affection, the recovery by a plaintiff-spouse constitutes separate
property of that spouse since the quantum of recovery is not measured by
loss of earning power, 24 although earning power might be somehow affected
by the loss. At the same time the legislature formulated this rule with
regard to characterization of personal injury recovery, it repealed the last
remaining vestige of the law regarding separate acknowledgements of married women. Enacted originally in 184625 to protect married women from
undue influence of their husbands, the rule was that a married woman must
acknowledge a transaction separately and apart from her husband after its
effect had been explained to her by a witnessing authority. If the acknowledgement were not made in accordance with the statutory prerequisite, the
transaction was void as to the married woman involved. Even though all
requirements of married women's separate acknowledgements were repealed
in 1963 and 1967,26 they are still applicable to contracts entered into before
they were repealed. In Click v. Seale, 27 for example, the court held that a
suit for specific performance would not lie in favor of an optionee against a
married woman who had granted the option in 1962, since the option was
executory in its nature and could be disaffirmed or resisted by the grantor at
any time in the future.
In Mitchim v. Mitchim28 the Texas Supreme Court recognized Arizona's
long-arm divorce jurisdiction over a Texas defendant and was thereby the
catalyst for revision of Texas' long-arm jurisdiction 29 and a significant
change in the rules of civil procedure.3 0 The legislature enacted two longarm jurisdiction statutes-section 3.26 with respect to divorce and section
11.051 with respect to the parent-child relationship. These are "minimum
contact" statutes designed to extend the personal jurisdiction of Texas courts
in domestic relations matters to respondents who reside outside the state.
With respect to the former, if the petitioner is a resident or domiciliary of
Texas when a suit is commenced to dissolve or avoid a marital relationship,
a non-resident respondent is subject to personal jurisdiction if (1) Texas was
22. The caption was consistent with the text of the proposed statute which provided
for abolition of actions for criminal conversation and alienation of affection, but in the
legislative process reference to alienation of affection was stricken from the text but
allowed
23.
24.
25.
26.

to stand in the caption.
TEX.REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5429b-2, § 3.04 (Supp. 1975-76).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a)(3) (1975).
[1846] Tex. Laws 156, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAws OF TEXAS 1462 (1898).
Ch. 309, § 6, [1967] Tex. Laws 735; ch. 473, § 1, [1963] Tex. Laws 1189.

27. 519 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).

28. 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 74, 103-04 (1975); Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 244, 249-52 (1975); Comment, State Court
Jurisdiction: The Long-Arm Reaches Domestic Relations Cases, 6 TEx. TEcH L. REV.
1021 (1975).

29. TEX.FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26, 11.051 (Supp. 1975-76).
30. TEX.R. Civ. P. 108.
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the last site of marital cohabitation which occurred within two years of the
date of filing the suit, or (2) "there is any basis consistent with the
Constitution of this state or the United States for the exercise of the personal
jurisdiction." 3' 1 The two-year time limit is inserted in the first provision in
the interest of basic fairness since "minimum contacts are eroded by passage
of time."3 2 This provision is not necessarily applicable to the second basis
of personal jurisdiction, nor need the last instance or period of marital
cohabitation have occurred within Texas. If, for example, Texas domiciliaries move from the state and separate shortly thereafter, and one spouse
immediately returns to Texas, personal jurisdiction may be asserted under
the second jurisdictional ground.33 The statute goes on to provide that a
court acquiring jurisdiction under its provisions "also acquires jurisdiction in
a suit affecting the parent-child relationship"3 4 under section 11.051, the
counterpart long-arm statute in chapter 11. The provision in chapter 11
does not, however, confer marital long-arm jurisdiction as a corollary to
jurisdiction in matters of parent-child relationship. That result might nevertheless follow under the provisions of section 3.26(a)(2) or the amended
version of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 108, hitherto dealing merely with
service of process on non-residents but now providing that a defendant served
with process outside Texas is bound "to the full extent that he may be
required to appear and answer under the Constitution of the United States in
an action either in rem or in personam. 13 5 Finally, though the statute has a
specified effective date of September 1, 1975, it is asserted that it has
retroactive effect since it is "remedial and procedural in form. '36 This view
is consistent with the construction of statutes enacted to achieve procedural
reform,37 but is inconsistent with the date specified for effect.
With respect to resident spouses, the most commonly employed means of
effecting service in divorce proceedings is waiver of process, but waiver is
ineffective if made before institution of suit.38 -In Deen v. Deen39 the wife
31. T X. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26(a) (2) (Supp. 1975-76).
32. See Sampson, Long-Arm JurisdictionMarries the Texas Family Code, 38 TEx.
B.J. 1023, 1027 (1975), where Professor Sampson, the principal draftsman of the longarm provisions, gives extensive discussion of those provisions as well as comments on
their legislative history.
33. Id.
34. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
35. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108. In a note to its order of July 22, 1975, the Supreme Court
of Texas stated that the purpose of the amendment "is to permit acquisition of in
personam jurisdiction to the constitutional limits." Professor Sampson remarks that this
amended version of rule 108 could make the long-arm amendments to the Family Code
redundant. Sampson, supra note 32, at 1026. On the other hand, Professor Baade
asserts that the rule's amendment is "an impermissible extension of the Texas long-arm
statute" under TEx. CONST. art. V, § 25. Baade, Letter, 38 TEx. B.J. 988 (1975).
Sampson responds that it is not only unlikely that the rule will be found unconstitutional but also that it may be construed "as merely a procedural enabling provision to ratify
existing long-arm statutes." Sampson, supra note 32, at 1033 n.20. Sampson further
asserts that the amendment of rule 108 in conjunction with the enactment of the
domestic relations long-arm provisions has the result of giving the "continuing jurisdiction" concept extraterritorial effect. Id. at 1031.
36. Sampson, supra note 32, at 1032.
37. See Harrison v. Cox, 524 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451, 412 P.2d 428 (1966); Annot., 19
A.L.R.3d 138 (1968).
38. TEx. REV.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2224 (1971).
39. 530 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
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waived service of process on June 21, and the husband's suit for divorce was
filed the following day. The wife failed to appear and a default judgment
was entered granting the divorce. After the husband's death the wife sought
to have the default set aside by equitable bill of review. The trial court
found that since the wife was at all times cognizant of the proceeding, she had
been negligent in allowing the judgment to be entered against her, and
denied equitable relief under Alexander v. Hagedorn.40 The court of civil
appeals reversed, holding that since there was no effective service or waiver
thereof, the wife "had no duty to do anything. It is elementary that where
there exists no duty to do or refrain from doing any act there could not be
'4 1
negligence by action or inaction.
-In In re Earin42 a Texas prisoner brought suit for divorce against a
foreign domiciliary in the county of his incarceration rather than in the
Texas county in which he had lived prior to imprisonment and to which he
intended to return upon his release. The appellate court affirmed the
conclusion of the trial court that the petitioner had failed to meet the
43
residence requirements prescribed in section 3.21 of the Family Code.
Although the court went on to say that a prisoner might become a resident
of the county in which incarcerated if he intends to be an inhabitant of that
county permanently, it is questionable whether mere intention would be
sufficient in such circumstances. In Brown v. Brown44 the wife brought suit
against her non-domiciliary husband who, in a stipulation attached to a
special appearance, agreed that in the event of his failure to make monthly
alimony payments his special appearance would be considered a general
appearance. The husband failed to make timely payments as agreed and
was treated as having submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the court.
Further, his failure to present himself at the trial was treated as a waiver of
his right to a record of the evidence. Dugie v. Dugie4 5 was distinguished as
a case in which the record showed that the defendant had a valid reason to
believe that the case would not go to trial on the merits and that he was
absent for that reason. Here the court concluded that the husband's absence
40. 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996 (1950). Hagedorn requires that the successful
petitioner for bill of review show (1) a meritorious defense to the cause of action, (2)
which the petitioner was prevented from making by the fraud, accident or wrongful act
of the other party, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence of his own.
41. The court concluded that the judgment was void for want of jurisdiction over the
wife. The court assumed, however, that a bill of review constituted the sole means of
obtaining relief and that requiring the wife to show lack of negligence on her part as well
as a meritorious defense to the original cause of action would violate due process of law.
Compare with Deen the court's more conventional treatment of equitable bill of review
and the grounds therefor in Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 530 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
Not to be confused with equitable bill of review is the more restrictive procedural
device of statutory bill of review, available only to a defendant allegedly served with
process by publication. TEx. R. Cxv. P. 329. For a discussion of the grounds for
statutory bill of review, see McCarthy v. Jesperson, 527 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1975, no writ).
42. 519 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
43. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (1975).
44. 520 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
45. 511 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ), commented on
in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 71 (1975).
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was either intentional or due to conscious indifference. The 'Dallas court of
civil appeals concluded in Cook v. Jones46 that a petitioner for divorce may
proceed in forma pauperis and be entitled to compel the county to effect
service of citation by publication and make return of citation at public
expense. 47 The highest court of New York has held, however, that in the
absence of statutory authorization an
indigent petitioner for divorce is not
48
entitled to counsel at public expense.
If a party fails to demand a jury and pay the jury fee until after the
opposing party has set the case for trial on the nonjury docket, the trial court
may properly deny a setting on the jury docket.4 9 In Roberts v. Roberts50
a default judgment was entered against the wife for failure to appear.
However, the default was entered two days prior to the date on which the
wife was cited to answer. The court of civil appeals set aside the default
judgment on petition for writ of error, since neither default nor waiver of
jury trial can occur prior to answer date.
Temporary orders may be entered with or without discovery proceedings51 and the trial court may enforce such orders through its contempt
powers. 52 A proper citation for contempt, however, runs from the court and
not the person of the judge toward whom particular conduct of the contemner is directed. If, for example, the judge of court B sits as the judge of
court A in which a divorce proceeding is filed, the judge may cite a party for
contempt only in his capacity as judge of court A and not as judge of court
B. 5" In Ex parte Gnesoulis5 4 the court entered a temporary order to pay
child support. After trial nearly two years later the judge informed counsel
for the parties that judgment should be entered along the lines which he
indicated therein. After receipt of this letter payments of child support
ceased to be made in accordance with the temporary order but, rather, were
paid as indicated in the letter, and temporary alimony ceased entirely. The
trial court found the failure to pay contemptuous, and a writ of habeas
corpus was brought. The court of civil appeals denied the writ, pointing out
that the letter did not constitute a rendition of judgment and the temporary
order remained in effect.
Apart from the enactment of the Social Services Amendments Act of 1974,
the most significant development in federal law with respect to family
46. 521 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
47. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Annot., Right of Indigent To
Proceed in MaritalAction Without Payment of Costs, 52 A.L.R.3d 844 (1973).
48. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1118 (1975).
49. Jackson v. Jackson, 524 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
50. Roberts v. Roberts, 525 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
51. For a general discussion of discovery, see Glieberman, Discovery Tactics in a
Divorce Case, 11 TRIAL, March-April 1975, at 56.
52. Ex parte Butler, 523 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1975, no
writ). But a part of a final order (in this instance an order to vacate premises) is not
enforceable by contempt until the final judgment is entered. Ex parte Valdez, 521
S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). For other disputes
concerning finality of a decree see Schwartz v. Jefferson, 520 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1975),
which also dealt in part with the right to occupy premises; Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d
952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
53. Ex parte Lowery, 518 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ).
54. 525 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
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litigation is a seeming break in the almost consistently applied principle of
abstention to entertain matters of family law. 'In Barber v. Barber55 the
United States Supreme Court set forth the basic abstention doctrine as it
applies in domestic relations matters: "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce or for the
allowance of alimony."'5 6 The Court, however, carved an exception to 'this
rule by characterizing the controversy between the former spouses as a mere
contract dispute between two people who were no longer husband and
wife. 57 Based upon the Barber exception, federal courts sitting in diversity
have continued to entertain actions to enforce state alimony decrees. However, these suits have generally been instituted in federal court by nonresident former wives against resident former husbands to enforce a decree
of a court of a different state. 58
Two recent cases involved federal court actions by resident wives to
enforce alimony judgments against non-resident former husbands. In Zimmerman v. Zimmerman59 the former wife, a resident of Pennsylvania, sued
her husband, a Florida resident, in a federal court in Pennsylvania to recover
support payments due under two written contracts executed by the parties
and incorporated by the Florida state court in a divorce decree. 60 Although
the court stated that domestic relations suits have traditionally been litigated
in state courts due to their expertise in such matters, the court noted that
there was growing authority for the proposition that suits to enforce separation agreements and property settlements could be maintained in federal
court provided the state court had resolved all issues involving the parties'
status, obligations to one another, and obligations to their children. 6 As the
case presented for determination did not involve those issues, the court held
that subject matter jurisdiction was satisfied.
In the second case, Hemphill v. Hemphill,6 2 a federal district court in
Georgia was petitioned by a resident former wife to enforce an alimony
decree entered by a Georgia state court against the former husband, a
resident of North Carolina. The court ruled that where the requisite
diversity and amount in controversy requirements are satisfied under 28
U.S.C. § 1332, the federal courts will entertain suits to recover alimony
6
arrearages. 3
55. 62 U.S. 582 (1858).

See also In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890) (child custody

case held to be within province of state judicial supervision); Williamson v. Williamson,
306 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Okla. 1969) (wife's prayer for declaration of her matrimonial

property rights not within judicial power of federal courts), discussed in McKnight &
Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 41 (1971).
56. 62 U.S. at 584.
57. Id. at 595. A further exception has evolved regarding federal abstention in this
area. In De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 162 (1899), the Supreme Court
announced that Burrus did not apply to the jurisdictional parameters of the territorial
courts or the appellate jurisdiction over those courts.
58. See, e.g., Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1954); Cain v. King, 313
F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La. 1970); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968);
Richie v. Richie, 186 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
59. 395 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
60. Id. at 721.
61. Id.
62. 398 F. Supp. 1134 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
63. Id. at 1138. The Hemphill court nevertheless dismissed the action for lack of in
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The significance of Zimmerman and Hemphill is that the federal district
courts are opening their doors to resident wives in cases involving domestic
relations issues. This is contrary to the former federal practice of allowing
only non-resident wives to sue resident husbands in federal court. It is
arguable that this expanded subject matter jurisdiction will result in forum
shopping. However, if the cases are limited to enforcing rather than
imposing alimony or child support payments, a striking extension of jurisdiction can be obviated; a federal court would merely be giving full faith and
credit to the state court decree. Thus, there would not be any advantage in
terms of the substantive law.
In Soloman v. Soloman6 4 the Third Circuit determined that subject matter
jurisdiction was lacking in the domestic relations controversy presented. The
court stated that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction if (1) the suit
involves custody of a child, (2) there is a pending case in state court
involving the same parties and issues, and (3) there is a threat that the
federal and state courts are being played off against each other.(, Since the
case presented involved all these elements, the court dismissed for what it
termed a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.6 6 Finally, in Armstrong v.
Armstrong67 the First Circuit ruled that comity and common sense dictated
federal judicial abstention in cases involving a husband's continuing obligation to support his family. For this reason the court dismissed the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Perhaps Soloman and Armstrong indicate
the circuit courts will be less enthusiastic than some district courts about entertaining domestic relations cases.
Little need be said of the grounds for divorce. In Baxla v. Baxla6 s a suit
for divorce was brought on grounds of insupportability, and the petitioner
testified that the marriage had irreparably broken down and that there was
no hope for reconciliation. The Dallas court of civil appeals concluded that
a prima facie case for dissolution is satisfied by the declaration of petitioner
that the marriage is insupportable, and that evidence of the petitioner's state
of mind in this regard is sufficient. The point was also made in Smitheal v.
Smitheal69 that the state of the divorce law at the time of marriage is not an
implied term of the contract of marriage.
B.

Characterizationof Marital Property

Since all acquisitions of spouses during marriage are presumed to be their
community property,70 the burden of proof on the issue of ownership is
personam jurisdiction, finding that the execution of a settlement agreement did not
constitute "doing business" under the applicable state long-arm statute. Id.
64. 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975).
65. Id. at 1025.
66. Id. at 1026.
67. 508 F.2d 348 (1st Cir. 1974). See also La Montagne v. La Montagne, 394 F.
Supp. 1159 (D. Mass. 1975).
68. 522 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
69. 518 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ dism'd).

70. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (1975); see Spector v. L Q Motor Inns, Inc., 517
F.2d 278, 282-83 (5th Cir. 1975).
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placed on the spouse asserting separate character. 7 1 In Newland v. Newland72 the court of civil appeals commented that, despite the general
requirement of "clear and convincing" evidence, the uncorroborated testimony of a spouse may suffice to rebut the presumption of community character.
Corroboration ordinarily is necessary when the facts at issue are by their
nature susceptible to recordation or knowledge by third persons. 73 In any
event, the "clear and convincing" nature of uncorroborated testimony would
certainly bear an inverse relationship to the degree of probability that
testimony of that nature, if true, would be amenable to corroboration. Proof
of separate ownership becomes particularly onerous when a spouse's separate
property becomes an integral part of the spouse's ordinary business activities,
because it is necessary in such situations to trace original separate ownership
to property on hand at the time of marital dissolution.74 In Smoak v.
Smoak 75 the husband proved ownership of fifty head of cattle prior to a
marriage of long duration, during which the herd increased. This evidence
was insufficient to show separate ownership of either the original number or
the augmented herd, but reimbursement may still be available. 76
In Cockerham v. Cockerham77 the husband and his brother each owned
an undivided one-half interest in realty. ,During the marriage the husband
and his wife sought to purchase the brother's share and did so (for reasons
not indicated in the opinion) by the tortuous route of a judicial proceeding
by which a receiver of the entire property was appointed to convey it to the
spouses. The conveyance recited consideration of about $12,000 borrowed
from a third person and about $12,000 in cash supplied by the spouses. The
latter element of consideration was wholly fictitious and merely represented
the husband's undivided half interest in the property. In the divorce
proceeding instituted seventeen years after the purchase, the wife's trustee in
bankruptcy intervened, asserting that the entire tract was community property. The trustee relied on the general presumption that acquisitions during
marriage constitute community property.78 The supreme court concluded,
however, that the husband "clearly trace[d] the original separate property
into the particular assets on hand during the marriage, ' 79 with the result that
the tract was one-half the husband's separate property and one-half community. The court emphasized the trial court's finding that the "partition suit
71. Jackson v. Jackson, 524 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
The presumption in this respect is complete, i.e., the presumption is not displaced merely
by a showing which tends to prove separate ownership (merely "bursting the bubble").
See generally Note, Pleading Separate Property in a Divorce Case, 27 BAYLOR L. Rv.
784 (1975).
72. 529 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ dism'd).
73. See Hampshire v. Hampshire, 485 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1972, no writ), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 33 (1973); Patterson v. Metzing, 424 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1967, no writ), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 48 (1969).
74. See generally, Comment, The Commingling of Separate and Community Property, The Requirement of Tracing in Texas, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 234 (1974).
75. 525 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, writ dism'd).
76. See notes 116-21 infra and accompanying text.
77. 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975).
78. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (1975); 527 S.W.2d at 167.
79. 527 S.W.2d at 165 n.1.
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only 'a means of convenience provided by law to
and sale was ...
' "0
Accepting this conclusion,
complete the purchase of the whole ....
the trustee went on to assert that the transaction had the end result of vesting
half the property in the wife as her separate property, with the other half in
the community. The trustee's argument was that because the husband had
used separate property to pay for land acquired in the name of both spouses,
there was a presumed gift to the wife of the husband's half. Although the
court recognized the existence of such a presumption, 8 ' it held that the
husband had been successful in establishing the lack of intention to make a
gift. The court noted the wife's admission that no gift was intended and
also ,the testimony of both spouses that their intention was merely to acquire
the brother's half and they were unaware of the legal means by which the
result was achieved.
The court's conclusion that the property was an undivided cotenancy
between the husband's separate estate and the community may be analyzed
as a conclusion in favor of substance over form. The court's approach may
also be characterized as a return to the consideration of intention as a
significant factor in the determination of the nature of marital property
82
acquisitions.
As a result of the curious results achieved in interpretation of the thenexisting simultaneous death act in Brown v. Lee s" the Probate Code was
amended 4 in 1965. Pritchard v. Snow s5 concerned competing claims to
the proceeds of the husband's life insurance policy after the husband and
wife were simultaneously killed in an accident. The policy was acquired by
the husband prior to marriage, and his wife was named as principal
beneficiary with his estate as secondary beneficiary should his wife not
survive him. The couple was not survived by descendants. The court
concluded that section 47(b) of the Probate Code is applicable only to life
insurance proceeds of a community policy and not to the proceeds of a
separate policy. Hence, the husband's estate was solely entitled to the
proceeds of the policy. 8 6
80. Since the receiver's deed contained no recital of the character of the property
conveyed, the parol evidence rule, as applied in Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908
(Tex. 1968), and Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d 777 (1952), was
seemingly deemed inapplicable. Cf. Brick & Tile, Inc. v. Parker, 143 Tex. 383, 186
S.W.2d 66 (1945).
81. Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314 (1856). In his dissent Justice Reavley referred to
the presumption as "a very weak one." 527 S.W.2d at 175. He also points out that the
presumption is equally applicable to a wife's acts in favor of her husband.
82. See McClintic v. Midland Grocery & Dry Goods Co., 106 Tex. 32, 154 S.W.
1157 (1913); Rath v. Rath, 218 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, no writ).
83. 371 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1963).
84. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 47(b) (1973).
85. 530 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
86. For a clarification of the amount includable for federal estate tax purposes in the
estates of spouses dying in close succession, by reason of their community ownership of a
life insurance policy on the life of the husband, see Rev. Rul. 75-100, 1975 INT. REV.
BULL. No. 12, at 15. The Service's ruling is that when the wife predeceases the husband

and no settlement of the wife's interest in the policy is made prior to the husband's
death, the amount includable in the wife's estate is one-half the value of the policy on the
date of her death, determined by the interpolated terminal reserve method. With respect

1976]

FAMILY LAW

In Revenue Ruling 75-50487 the Revenue Service takes the position that
when a Texas spouse transfers separate property to the other, one-half of the
value of the transferred property and one-half of the income on hand is
includable in the donor's estate. 88 The reasoning is that under Texas law
income from separate property is community property, and, therefore, the
donor spouse has transferred property with a retention for life of the right to
the income from one-half of the property. The Supreme Court of Texas
has, however, stated on three occasions that the settlor of a trust or the donor
of other inter vivos gifts may provide that the future income from the
property shall be the separate property of the donee.8 9 The Service's
reasoning, therefore, does not cover all situations. 0
C.

Division on Divorce

With respect to division of matrimonial property on divorce the trial court
is directed by the legislature to do equity. 91 Although the courts have
indicated that certain unvested rights in property are not subject to division, 92 there has been some disagreement as to whether certain vested
to the estate of the husband, one-half of the proceeds from the policy is includable in his

gross estate.
With respect to estate tax treatment of the proceeds of a life insurance policy
transferred in contemplation of death by the insured, who paid the subsequent premiums,
see in re Silverman, 521 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1975). The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue merely sought (and gained) affirmance of the Tax Court's holding that an
estate tax was applicable to the proceeds less a pro rata share attributable to the
premiums paid by the beneficiary. In its seeming reluctance to reduce the amount of
proceeds subject to tax the appellate court brings back memories of Rev. Rul. 67-463,
1967-2 CuM. BULL. 327, replaced by Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 329. For
related cases see McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw.
L.J. 27, 32-33 (1973); McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
25 Sw. L.J. 34, 51-53 (1971); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 48-51 (1969).
87. Rev. Rul. 75-504, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 47, at 14.
88. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
89. Strickland v. Wester, 131 Tex. 23, 112 S.W.2d 1047 (1938) (dictum in case
involving non-trust gift by husband to wife); Cauble v. Beaver-Electra Ref. Co., 115 Tex.
1, 274 S.W. 120 (1925) (dictum in case not involving gifts between husband and wife
but nevertheless decided the same day as Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799
(1925), which is relied on by the Service in its ruling); Hutchison v. Mitchell, 39 Tex.
487 (1872) (gift in trust by husband for wife providing that income should be her
separate property).
Lower court decisions have reached the same conclusion. Sullivan v. Skinner, 66 S.W.
680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, writ ref'd); McClelland v. McClelland, 37 S.W. 350 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1896, writ ref'd); Monday v. Vance, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 374, 32 S.W. 559
(1895, no writ); Shepflin v. Small, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 493, 23 S.W. 432 (1893, no writ).
But see Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 279 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Some of these cases were discussed in Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir.
1945), where the court did not deal with this specific question. In reaching its
conclusion the Revenue Service also rejected a dictum to the contrary in United States v.
Hines, 180 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1950), aff'g 11 T.C. 314 (1948), nonacquiesced, 1949-1
CUM. BULL. 5.

90. See Tracy, Taxation, p. 356 infra, at 384-87. For a widow's income-tax-amortization of cost of a life estate in a trust created by her and her husband with community
estate see Kuhn v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D. Tex. 1975). For related cases
see McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 5354 (1971).
91. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975).
92. Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial
Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27 (1973); Lumpkins v. Lumpkins,
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interests, although not capable of direct divestiture, are nonetheless subject to
punishable by
indirect divestiture either by way of an in personam order
93
property.
other
of
division
court-ordered
a
by
or
contempt
Courts give consideration to the expectancies of the parties, but expectancies are always, by their nature, difficult to assess in making a division of
property on divorce. Present earning capacity of a spouse and immediate
future needs generally have been considered in making division resulting

from fault. More remote expectancies, especially those having no nexus to
the marriage to be dissolved, have dubious bearing on division, although one

court apparently considered a spouse's anticipated inheritance.9 4 Another
court reviewed a property division which involved expectations of employment in a case of no-fault divorce.95

The division of the trial court was

519 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Davis v. Davis, 495
S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ dism'd), discussed in McKnight, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 73 (1974); see Goldman, A
Community Property Citizen's Plea to Congress, 61 A.B.AJ. 1495 (1975); Sage,
Military Retired Pay in Texas: A New Outlook, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 28 (1975). But see
Brown v. Brown, Civil No. L.A. 30463 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Jan. 16, 1976), overruling French
v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775 (1941). See also Note, Pleading Separate Property in a
Divorce Case, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 784 (1975).
In Echols v. Austron, Inc., 529 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ),
the court held that, because rights are fixed when a judgment is rendered, a bonus paid to
a husband-corporate executive after rendition of the divorce judgment but prior to the
entry of that judgment was not community property; therefore, the wife was not entitled
to one-half of the bonus.
93. Foreign realty: Deger v. Deger, 526 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975,
no writ) (consideration of holdings in foreign realty in dividing other properties);
Walker v. Walker, 231 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1950, no writ)
(consideration of foreign realty acquired during marriage in making division of other
property); cf. Estabrook v. Wise, 506 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ
granted, but dismissed ab initio as moot) (case involving foreign realty not dealt with or
considered by the divorce court), commented on by Baade, Domestic Relations in the
Conflict of Laws, in TExAs FAMILY LAw AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 63, and addendum
(J. McKnight ed. 1975), and noted in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 84 (1975); Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 244, 253 (1975).
Rights under federal law: Arnold v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 42 (S.D. Tex. 1971),
noted in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 31,
33 (1972); Miguez v. Miguez, 453 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970, no
writ), noted in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw.
L.J. 34, 41 (1971).
Federal pension rights unaffected by the Pension Reform Act of 1974 are discussed in
Ray, Trusts and Pensions (including effects of Pension Reform Act of 1974), in TEXAS
FAMILY LAW AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 183 (J. McKnight ed. 1975).

However, it has

been argued that, because the federal government is subject to garnishment in the same
way as any other debtor, federal pension rights are subject to direct division by state
courts as an inferential result of the Social Services Amendments Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-647 (Jan. 4, 1975) (codified in various sections of 28 U.S.C.), commented on in
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 108 (1975).
Spendthrift trust interests or interests in income of a non-distributable discretionary
trust: Currie v. Currie, 518 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ
dism'd), commented on in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29
Sw. L.J. 67, 76-77 (1975).
Certain interests which by their terms may be non-assignable under state law are, at
least, subject to indirect disposition or may be taken into consideration in dividing other
property on divorce. Gillis v. Gillis, 435 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth

1968, writ dism'd), commented on in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas

Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 49, 52 (1970). See also Projector, Valuation of Retirement Benefits in
Marriage Dissolutions,50 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 229 (1975).
94. Whittenburg v. Whittenburg, 523 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no
writ).
95. Thomas v. Thomas, 525 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1975, no writ).
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strikingly disproportionate: an award of approximately $34,000 to one
spouse and $27,000 to the other. Although the husband received the larger
amount, the sex of each was apparently irrelevant for purposes of the
division. Both parties were employed and apparently in good health.
Neither party was alleged or shown to be to blame for ending the
marriage.

.

.

.The disparity between the shares awarded to the parties

does not appear to be related to providing support or education for the
children. The only factor we can find in the record which might influence an unequal division of the property in favor of the appellee
was his testimony concerning his employment. He said that if [he
should lose his job, he would be left with only] about $12,500 in his
retirement fund. .

.

.He testified that those who have left [his place

of employment] found it almost impossible to find a job and that people
in this area do not regularly hire aerospace engineers. 90
The court observed that this sort of information "does not furnish an
equitable basis for the property division ordered in this case [and amounted
to] an abuse of judicial discretion."'97 Future earning power unrelated to
the cause of action should not, therefore, be considered in the division of
property on divorce.
In some instances a spouse has so dealt with separate personalty as to
justify its divestiture in favor of the other spouse. In Wells v. Hiskett9s the
court noted that if a spouse fraudulently expands separate corporate assets at
the expense of the community, a divorce court may properly treat those
assets as community property. If there is not significant community property to divide in order to do equity between the spouses, courts have resorted
to separate personalty for that purpose. -In Dillingham v. Dillingham99 the
court held that a separate corporate interest so closely held as to constitute
the alter ego of a spouse would justify division of that separate property in
favor of the other spouse. 10 0 And in Uranga v. Uranga'01 a court of civil
appeals once again concluded that a husband's separate corporate interest
was so inextricably associated with his conduct of business affairs as to
amount to his alter ego. It was 102therefore, treated as community property for
purposes of division on divorce.
In dividing property under section 3.63 of the Family Code, some courts
have failed to distinguish separate real and personal property, 0 3 but this
96. Id. at 202.
97. Id.
98. 288 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
99. 434 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ dism'd w.o.j.). See
also Mea v. Mea, 464 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, no writ).
100. In Dillingham the corporate-owner-husband did not complain of the court's
abuse of discretion but rather of its treating separate property as though it were
community property. In Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1974), noted in 6 TEx. TECH
L. REV. 259 (1975), the question was not abuse of discretion but whether the trial court
considered separate corporate holdings in making its division on divorce. Neither the
court of civil appeals nor the supreme court cited Dillingham. The supreme court
concluded that the trial court had considered those separate holdings and thereby
inferentially approved that approach under TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975).
101. 527 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ dism'd).
102. The court relied on Mea v. Mea, 464 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971,
no writ), as well as Dillingham.
103. See Merrell v. Merrell, 527 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd
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approach is subject to some dispute. After careful consideration of all prior
reported cases, the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals concluded that a
divorce court lacks power in the division of property to divest title to
separate realty.' 04 The court interpreted section 3.63 as a reenactment of
old article 4638,105 thereby employing a line of reasoning not pursued in
other appellate decisions, but nevertheless appropriate in light of its legislative history.' 0
Another problem faced by courts attempting to make an appropriate
division of matrimonial property on divorce concerns the spouses' liability to
third persons. Although section 3.63 and its statutory predecessors have
been part of Texas jurisprudence since 1841, our appellate courts have given
little guidance with respect to disposition of the liabilities of a marriage (as
opposed to assets) upon divorce. Existing authority seems to be rooted in
the dubious and perhaps now discredited opinion of the court of civil appeals
in Hubbard v. Hubbard.0 7 In that case the appellate court approved a
judicial partition of community property on divorce in which the property set
apart for the wife was freed of all charges of community debts previously
incurred by the husband. This conclusion was amplified in 1924108 with
the enunciation of the proposition that a divorce court may require the
husband to pay all debts incurred during the marriage. In 1944 the San
Antonio court of civil appeals affirmed a decree in which the husband was
ordered to pay a joint note incurred by the husband and wife during
marriage. 10 9 All these cases, however, were decided before 1963, when a
married woman had little, if any, general contractual capacity. Prior to
1963 most significant contractual indebtedness was incurred by the husband,
or by the wife as his agent, generally as his agent of necessity. Even when
the wife was the joint maker of a note with her husband for the purchases of
family necessaries, she was not personally liable. 110 Since 1963, however,
the wife's contractual capacity has become unlimited with respect to binding
herself and since 1967 substantial community assets may be subject to her
control and to the liability generated by her contracts. Prior to 1968
community debts were those contracted by the husband (or by the wife on
his behalf) and all community property within the husband's control could
be reached to satisfy them. Today the term "community debts" is less
meaningful because it merely indicates that some community property (not
n.r.e.); Baxla v. Baxla, 522 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ). See also
Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ),
commented on in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67,
79 (1975); Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal to Revise
Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 209 (1975).
104. 524 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
105. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4638 (1925).
106. See McKnight, Commentary to the Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX. TECH L. REv.

281, 337-38 (1974). In 1975 the Texas House of Representatives passed H.R. 454 (64th
Leg.) to restore the 1968 language of old art. 4638, but the bill died in the Texas Senate.
107. 38 S.W. 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ).
108. Hughes v. Hughes, 259 S.W. 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1924, writ dism'd).
109.

Mangum v. Mangum, 184 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1944, no

writ).
110. Humbles v. Hefley-Stedman Motor Co., 127 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1939, no writ).
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necessarily that controlled by the husband) may be liable for satisfaction of
the debt under section 5.61 of the Family Code."1
Section 3.63 of the Family Code authorizes a divorce court to divide the
estate of the spouses as it deems "just and right." The legislature does not,
however, specifically mention either assets or liabilities, nor does it indicate
whether it is speaking in terms of the net or gross estate. A decree ordering
the husband to discharge liabilities incurred by him during the marriage
usually constitutes a reiteration of his existing liability or a reflection that
certain debts incurred by the wife were for necessariesfor which the husband
was liable both in his capacity as manager of the community estate and of
his separate estate. Such decrees are seldom appealed. Since 1967 third
parties have been allowed to participate in divorce proceedings in most
courts of special and general jurisdiction in order that their rights may be
resolved as well. 1 12 In Broadway Drug Store v. Trowbridge,118 where a
creditor intervened in a divorce proceeding, the appellate court held it
impermissible to vary the spouse's liability to a creditor even when the
creditor is before the court. The inference is clear that the divorce court
cannot alter the contractual relationships between a spouse and a prior
creditor, thereby severely limiting the rule in Hubbard. This result is
supported by numerous cases which conclude that divorce courts cannot, in
the absence of a showing of fraud or like grounds, alter contracts-even
those between the spouses for the division of property or for support of
children. Nonetheless, in an effort to divide the community estate equitably,
the trial courts have continued to order a particular spouse to discharge liabilities incurred by either-usually in circumstances when the spouse ordered
to pay was personally liable anyway. By making such an order, the trial
court is attempting to achieve the objective sought in Hubbard; that is, to
exonerate community assets partitioned to the other spouse which would otherwise be liable for the satisfaction of the debt. Problems inherent in such
decrees are most perceptively pointed out by the Texarkana court of civil
appeals in Dorfman v. Dorfman 14 where the court concluded that there are
certain substantial "pitfalls" to this type of decree and that creditors' rights
may not be prejudiced. The court did not speculate as to (1) whether such
an order gives a creditor a right of recovery against the spouse ordered to
pay; (2) whether the spouse who originally contracted the debt is given a
right to recover from the spouse ordered to pay if the contracting spouse pays
the debt voluntarily or if judgment is taken against him and his property is
taken on execution; 115 or (3) whether the divorce court could properly hold
111. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 81
(1974).
112. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 2338-3, -5, -7, -8 to -9b.1, -10 to -lib, -13 to
-20, -22, -23 (1975).
113. 435 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ).
114. 457 S.W.2d 417, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970, no writ).
115. In Walker v. Walker, 527 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no
writ), this question was posed, though with insufficient particularity to permit resolution
by the court. The problems resulted from an oversight of the trial court in dealing with
marital debts in making a division of property upon divorce. The trial court's order
reiterated the liability of each spouse for all obligations incurred and unpaid during the
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the ordered spouse in contempt for failure to comply with the order.
Problems of reimbursement on divorce were before the appellate courts in
several instances. As a general rule, on dissolution of marriage, a spouse
whose separate property has been used for the benefit of the community
estate or whose share of the community property has been used for the
benefit of the separate estate of the other spouse, may seek reimbursement
of those funds. The reimbursement is in an amount not to exceed the sum

expended or the degree of enhancement, whichever is less.' 16 On the other
hand, when community funds are used to discharge an indebtedness against
separate property, or when separate funds are used for the same purpose to
benefit a community estate, the cost and not enhancement is the proper
measure of reimbursement. 117 If the general division of property on
divorce is seemingly equitable, however, some appellate courts do not look
too closely at the underlying rules of reimbursement." 8 For example, in
Carson v. Carson' 9 the trial court's arguably arbitrary award based on the
wife's payment for repairs to the husband's separate property was summarily
upheld despite the apparent absence of fact findings concerning the degree of
enhancement. Further, while trial courts have wide equitable discretion in
assessing rights of reimbursement for improvements, 'the court in Newland v.
Newland 20 made it clear that the degree of "enhancement . . . must be
proved both as to the fact and amount" by the spouse seeking to recover by
2
reimbursement. 1 1
A divorce court may also exercise its equitable judgment in awarding
attorneys' fees. The decision to award fees should be based upon a dual
inquiry: first, whether to award fees as part of the division, and second, how
marriage, but the court failed to provide for the liability of one spouse to the other for
contribution if one should make full discharge of a liability for which both were jointly
and severally liable. In his concurring opinion Chief Justice Massey wisely suggests that
provisions for this eventuality should be included in divorce decrees.
116. Girard v. Girard, 521 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1975,
no writ). However, should a court err in making its award for reimbursement, the
spouse in whose favor the error runs will have no basis for complaint on appeal. Id. at
718. See also McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw.
L.J. 34, 44 (1971); cf. Comment, Development of a Separate Property Oil and Gas
Lease with Community Funds, 27 BAYLOR L REv. 743 (1975).
117. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935). A contrary conclusion
seems to have been reached in Jackson v. Jackson, 524 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1975, no writ), but the equities of the situation are not discussed.
118. See, e.g., Jackson v. Jackson, 524 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no
writ); Robbins v. Robbins, 519 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no
writ).
119. 528 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
120. 529 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
121. Id. at 110. See also Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d 777 (1952).
In Newland the court likened dissolution of a business partnership to division on
dissolution of a "marital partnership":
Save for the presumptions at law . . . there is not a distinction to be
made from the analogous situation where two persons are partners in a
business enterprise, while one of them is at the same time dealing in real
estate as his private business . . . and where from time to time there is
action resulting in indebtedness owing from the partners to the individual,
or from the individual to the partners (or partnership account)....
The question at any important time is whether the accounts of the partnership and the individual have been settled so neither owes the other, or if
not settled what amount is owed from the one to the other.
529 S.W.2d at 109.
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much should be awarded. Due to judicial habit resulting from the state of
the law prior to 1963, courts have rarely given serious consideration ,to the
first inquiry. Texas courts have traditionally characterized the attorney's
fees incurred by a wife as a "necessary" of the marriage, and therefore, a
liability of the husband. The reason for this characterization is that the
wife, lacking full contractual capacity, acts as an agent of necessity for the
husband in contracting for the "necessary" attorney's services.' 22 Now that
wives are endowed with full contractual capacity, 123 characterization of the
wife's attorney's fees as "necessaries" appears outmoded. It is more appropriate to treat attorney's fees as an element in the equitable division of
marital property, or perhaps as a cost of dissolution. This was the trial
court's approach in Brown v. Brown.12 4 However, in exercising its discretion the divorce court should either consider both parties' attorneys' fees as a
cost of winding up the marriage (deducting all fees from the community before division), or leave the parties to discharge their own fees." 25 Regardless
of the juristic foundation of an award of attorney's fees, it is clear that an
award must be supported by the pleadings. In Carson v. Carson 26 the wife
had agreed to pay her attorney $500, and that amount was claimed in her
pleadings. The trial court awarded $500 and went on to make a contingent
award of an additional $250, should there be an appeal. The additional
award was stricken as unsupported by the pleadings. The clear lesson of
2
Carson is that the prayer for attorney's fees should be couched generally.
The availability of direct or collateral attack of property divisions was
questioned on several occasions. In one instance 128 the former wife sought
by bill of review 'to set aside a judgment incorporating an agreed property
122. The term "necessary" had additional significance in that the wife has traditionally been the petitioner in divorce proceedings, with her claim traditionally founded
upon fault. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67,
80-81 (1975).
123. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.03 (1975).
124. 520 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). In
Brown the court discussed Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005

(1950): "In this case the court . . . fixed liability for the wife's attorney's fees as
a part of its 'making an equitable division of the estate.'" 520 S.W.2d at 578-79. See also
Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974), no writ),
discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 81
(1975). When the divorce court orders each party to discharge his or her own attorney's

fees in a particular amount, there is no judgment as between attorney and client sufficient to support a writ of garnishment. Douthit v. Anderson, 521 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, no writ). For ethical problems raised in this type of situation see
TEX. ETHICS COMM. Op. No. 374, 37 TEX. B.J. 1085 (1974), discussed in McKnight,
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 82 (1975). See also Pate
Receives Reprimand, 39 TEx. B.J. 117 (1976).

125. Though the court may not make sex a determinant for award, the Equal Rights
Amendment, TEX. CoNsT. art. I, § 3a, does not preclude a wife's recovery of fees, since
either spouse may be so entitled under Texas law. Lipshy v. Lipshy, 525 S.W.2d 222
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ dism'd).

Contra, interpreting Pennsylvania law, De

Rosa v. De Rosa, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 71 (C.P. Delaware County 1972); Kehl v. Kehl, 57
Pa. D. & C.2d 164 (C.P. Allegheny County 1972).
126. 528 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
127. See also Masters v. Stair, 518 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1975,

no writ), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J.
67, 82 (1975).

128. McFarland v. Reynolds, 513 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1974,
no writ).
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settlement. She alleged that the husband fraudulently represented the value
of the community estate and the amount of its debts, and the appellate court
held that such was sufficient to state a cause of action. 1 29 In another
case 1.3 0 an ex-wife sought by bill of review to set aside an agreed property
settlement. However, the court not only failed to find any evidence of the
ex-husband's fraud but also concluded that the ex-wife had failed to establish
one of the vital elements entitling her to a bill of review-her lack of fault or
negligence in connection with the prior proceeding. Although the ex-wife
had been without counsel in the earlier matter, it was demonstrated that she
was quite familiar with such proceedings and fully capable of procuring
counsel. She conceded that she was under no compulsion to enter into the
settlement. The court concluded that she was negligent in failing to make
an accurate determination of the value of the property in question. Finally,
another case1 3 ' involved a post-divorce assertion that certain property in
issue between the ex-husband and third persons constituted community
property not dealt with on divorce. The court, however, found no fraudulent concealment, and that the action actually involved separate property,
thereby indicating that since the property was the husband's separate
property, failure to divulge dealings concerning it was irrelevant. 1 32 Although this may have been correct with respect to the particular facts of the
133
case, this conclusion will not follow in all circumstances.
34
,In Peddicord v. Peddicord1 the former husband was sued for payments
due under a decree embodying a property settlement agreement. The
decree recited that the agreement was contractual in nature, and it was
approved by the court and incorporated in the judgment. The husband did
not argue that the trial court had made an impermissible grant of permanent
alimony,13 5 nor did the wife assert that the husband was barred by
estoppel. 3 6 The husband asserted a contractual defense which was clearly
inappropriate ground for collateral attack. In his concurring opinion Justice
Keith discusses the problems of raising fraud and mistake "or other contractual defenses,"' 3 7 concluding that they apply only to direct attacks, in which
138
category he includes bills of review.
129. The dissenting judge, however, would have rejected her bill of review on the
ground of evidence of fraud and negligence on her part. Id. at 628-36. On propriety of
bill of review see note 40-41 supra.

130. Crispin v. Crispin, 529 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
131. Cowart v. Cowart, 515 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd

n.r.e.).
132. Id. at 362.
133. See Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1974), rev'g 504 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1974), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 79-80 (1975), noted in 6 TEx. TECH. L. REV.259 (1974).
134. 522 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

135. See Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1967).
136. Andrews v. Andrews, 441 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
137.

522 S.W.2d at 268.

138. Justice Keith further examined this question at the annual convention of the
State Bar of Texas in Dallas on July 2, 1975, in his speech, "Separation Agreements
Embodied in Divorce Proceedings--Contracts or Judgments?" He concluded that divorce decrees incorporating property settlements have the same effect as the terms of

decrees entered by consent, except perhaps for purposes of enforcement by contempt. He
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Federal tax consequences are significant in all divorce settlement agreements.' 3 9

In United States v. Mooney

40

the Internal Revenue Service

brought suit to recover an income tax refund overpayment. The Service had
incorrectly divided an income tax refund on a joint return equally between
the taxpayer and his former wife; the ex-wife, however, was entitled to a
greater proportion of the refund under federal law because she had earned
the greater proportion of the income. The court held that the Service was
entitled to recover the overpayment from the taxpayer notwithstanding an
agreement between the former spouses in which the wife released the

husband from any duty to account to her for the disproportionate share of the
refund he might receive.
A federal case heard in Massachusetts141 points up some tax consequences of vested contract rights and those acquired by judgment in connection with divorce. The court held that a Massachusetts alimony award was
not subject to a federal tax lien against the ex-wife because the order was not
final even with respect to payments due. However, the converse is true with
42
respect to a vested contract right.'
noted, however, that for these purposes the decree must be within the jurisdiction of the
court (i.e., in making a division of property) thereby disposing of the "permanent
alimony" argument. He adds that if the contempt power is used for enforcement of
property settlement decrees, the result might constitute imprisonment for debt. In Ex
parte Sutherland, 526 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. 1975), however, the court held that confinement
for contempt of a court's order to pay a portion of retirement benefits when received by
the ex-husband did not constitute imprisonment for debt. An order for compliance with
a property settlement decree in a case like Peddicord would seemingly have the same
result except insofar as the settlement agreement included a provision for contractual
alimony. However, it is difficult to establish that a provision is one for alimony rather
than a property division in the contractual context.
By the principle of full faith and credit, accrued alimony installments unpaid under a
final foreign alimony decree incorporating an agreed provision of a settlement agreement
are enforceable debts in Texas courts. Reysa v. Reysa, 521 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).
139. Careful tax planning of the consequences of divorce has long been regarded as
axiomatic. See Vaughan, Texas Divorce, Planning the Tax Results, 38 Tax. B.J. 1035
(1975); Vaughan, Community Property Divorce: A Comprehensive Tax Planning
Approach, 2 COMM. PROP. J. 148 (1975); Vaughan, Community Property Divorce:
Preparing the Tax Returns, 2 COMM. PROP. J. 213 (1975); cf. J. TAGGART, SOME TAX
ASPECTS OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE (1973); DuCanto, Tax Aspects of Separation and
Divorce, 16 ABA FAMILY LAW SEcTION BULL. Fall 1975, at 15; Winter 1975, at 11.
See also Note, The Recognition of Gain in Property Settlements Pursuant to DivorceWiles v. Commissioner, 28 Sw. L.J. 1073 (1974).
140. 400 F. Supp. 98 (N.D. Tex. 1975). On the obligation of each spouse to pay tax
on one-half of income see Bowling v. United States, 510 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1975).
141. United States v. Rye, 390 F. Supp. 528 (D. Mass. 1975).
142. The court further held that requiring a divorced husband to pay his former wife's
income taxes for certain years was not an order which the United States had standing to
enforce by direct action against the former husband. The Revenue Service was not,
therefore, a third party beneficiary. On the other hand, if the order were part of a
property settlement agreement confirmed and made part of a Texas divorce decree, it
would seem difficult to resist enforcement by the Revenue Service.
Two other cases involved federal tax consequences of divorce settlements. In Fox v.
United States, 510 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1975), the court held that a former husband
indebted for alimony payments over a period of years without income tax consequences
to the ex-wife was not entitled to a deduction for imputed interest on installment
payments under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 483.
In Gray v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 693 (C.D. Cal. 1974), a property settlement
agreement provided that the ex-husband should maintain a policy of life insurance on his
life in favor of the ex-wife and this agreement was incorporated in the decree. After the
husband's death his executor was entitled to deduct policy proceeds in computing the
estate tax.
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Disputes with respect to property undivided on divorce usually occur when
counsel for both parties fail to recognize possible community assets. 1 43 The
most common oversight is with respect to retirement benefits. Retirement
benefits
which vest during marriage are presumed to be community property,144 and if undivided upon divorce, such benefits are held by the former
spouses as tenants in common. 145 'In Clendenin v. Krock1 46 the court held
that a divorce decree which recited that the parties had acquired no
community property during marriage was not res judicata when the ex-wife
subsequently sought partition of undivided retirement benefits. The crucial
factor was that the retirement benefits had not "been before the court." If
the characterization had been litigated and the property deemed separate
property of the husband, the determination obviously would have been res
1 47
judicata.
In Fox v. Smith 148 the husband was a participant in a funded employer
profit-sharing plan, the interest in which was undivided upon his divorce. He
subsequently remarried and designated his sister as the beneficiary of his
share. After his death, his ex-wife was held entitled to one-half the fund.
Gaines v. Gaines'49 involved a community interest in a joint venture. The
divorce court awarded the husband specific property of the venture with the
apparent concurrence of the other ventures and awarded the wife a fractional
interest in the venture. After the divorce the ex-wife asserted that the
award to the husband was improper and, therefore, ineffective. The court
held that the division was unexceptional under the circumstances since there
was no showing that the other venturers objected to the court's award. It may
be surmised that while the divorce was pending the venturers had agreed to
a partial dissolution to be accomplished by carving the property (later
awarded the husband) out of the venture. 1 0
On several occasions the federal courts have examined the impact of a
husband's subsequent bankruptcy on his obligations under a divorce settlement. In In re Nunnally'5 ' the Fifth Circuit held ,that a money judgment
143. The severe consequences of malpractice in this regard are exemplified in Smith
v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 315, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975). In that case the
court upheld an award of $100,000 in damages against an attorney who had failed to
conduct adequate legal research to determine that certain retirement benefits of the
husband were community property and subject to division on divorce. See 107 TIME,
Jan. 12, 1976, at 53.

144. Fulton v. Duhaime, 525 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
145. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970); Clendenin v. Krock, 527 S.W.2d
471 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1975, no writ).

146. 527 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
147. See the concurring opinion in Clendenin, id. at 474.
148. 531 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
149. 519 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
150. Difficulties encountered in enforcing a decree involving an award of shares in a
corporation closely held by the family of an ex-spouse are illustrated by Earthman's, Inc.
v. Earthman, 526 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
Regarding the unavailability of garnishment of a state agency to obtain satisfaction of a
money judgment in a divorce decree, see Addison v. Addison, 530 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ). See generally Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce
Judgments and Property Settlement Agreements in Texas, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 645
(1974).

151. 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975), commented on in McKnight, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 92 (1975).
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awarded to an ex-wife for reimbursement or repayment of a loan constituted
"alimony" for purposes of bankruptcy and was, therefore, not subject to
discharge in the husband's proceeding. 15 2 The court pointed out that, in
spite of the fact that permanent alimony is not awarded on divorce by Texas
courts, a property division may take into account future support needs.
Hence, a Texas property division contains "a substantial element of alimonysubstitute, support, or maintenance, however termed,' 153 and, therefore,
falls within the "alimony" exception to debts discharged in bankruptcy. In
In re Hodges'5 4 a property settlement agreement between the spouses had
been approved and incorporated in the decree of divorce. As part of the
property settlement the husband agreed to pay the wife $56,000 at the rate
of $300 a month. The court was concerned that this constituted "alimony
substitute" within the doctrine of Nunnally. Looking behind the decree, the
court concluded that one of the principal reasons why the husband agreed to
periodic payments was to provide for the support and maintenance of his
wife; hence the indebtedness constituted "alimony substitute." The bankruptcy court's conclusion is, therefore, that in applying Nunnally to a
particular situation the bankruptcy court must determine whether a particular indebtedness arising out of a court decree or contractual property
settlement constitutes an "alimony substitute" as a matter of fact.' 55
D. Management of Marital Property
A purported gift of community property, even if subject to the donor
spouse's sole management, is subject to attack by the non-donor spouse as a
constructive fraud upon the latter's interest. When the gift is not supported
by a moral obligation, as to a close relative, the donee has the burden of
proving the reasonableness of the gift in light of the surrounding circumstances.' 56 In Great American Reserve Insurance Co. v. Sanders'5 7 the
Texas Supreme Court inferred that an ex-wife conservator might not be a
"close relative" and, therefore, would have the burden of showing reasonableness. 155 When the gift is founded upon a moral obligation, for example
a gift to children of the marriage, apparently the non-donor spouse must
show that the gift is unreasonable under the circumstances. In Becknal v.
152. Bankruptcy Act, § 17(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (Supp. 1975).
153. In Girard v. Girard, 521 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]

1975, no writ), the court enunciated the established principle that adjustment of property

rights does not constitute "alimony" under Texas law.
154. No. BK 3-74-72 (Bk. Ct. N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 1975).
155. In In re Parnass, No. BK 3-3473-F (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 1974), the court
held that an award of $200,000 for "support to be received in addition to the [wife's]
portion of the community property" as provided in the property settlement decree was
discharged in bankruptcy: "the alleged debt ...was void because it was based on
permanent alimony to be paid after divorce by court order."
156. Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28
Sw. L.J. 66, 79-80 (1974).
157. 525 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. 1975).
158. id. at 959. The supreme court, however, upheld the trial court's determination
that the ex-wife-conservator had successfully rebutted the widow's prima facie case of
constructive fraud. The policy was apparently taken out in lieu of the husband's
discharge of his delinquent support obligation for his children by the ex-wife.
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Atwood 5 9 the husband created an irrevocable spendthrift trust of virtually
all of the community estate with his wife as trustee and children as
beneficiaries. After the husband's death one of the children instituted a
proceeding against the trustee-widow contesting the validity of the trust.
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the husband's conveyance
of his wife's share of the community property was a nullity as a constructive
fraud upon her interest, and that the conveyance operated to partition the
community property. The appellate court rejected this conclusion; apart
from the fact that the wife-trustee's active role in the trust plan negated any
issue of deceit, the widow made no assertion as to the invalidity of the
transfer. 16 0
The most significant decision of the year is Cockerham v. Cockerham,16'
which represents the final blow, perhaps predetermined by preliminary
63
2
punches in Cooper v. Texas Gulf Industries, Inc.16 and Dulak v. Dulak,
to the intended meaning of section 5.22 of the Family Code.16 4 In
subsection (a) of section 5.22 it is provided that a spouse has sole
management of that community property which he or she would have owned
if single, including, but not limited to, personal earnings, revenues from
separate property, recoveries for personal injuries, and the increase in
mutations of those interests. Subsection (b) provides that if community
property subject to the sole management of one spouse is combined with that
subject to the sole management of the other spouse, the resulting mixture or
combination is subject 'to joint management of the spouses. Finally, subsection (c) provides, that community property that does not come within the
purview of subsection (a) is also subject to the spouses' joint management.
Whereas the draftsmen intended subsection (c) as a residuary clause to
cover any unanticipated omissions from coverage under subsections (a) and
(b), the supreme court appears to treat subsection (c) as applicable to most
situations involving the management of community property. This result is
not due to any presumptive applicability of subsection (c), but rather a
narrowing of the scope of subsections (a) and (b). The court seems to read
subsection (a) as providing that each spouse has sole management of
community property that he or she would have owned solely if single and
subsection (b) as applying only to actual combining or mixing of community
159.
160.
Box v.
Christi

518 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ).
Somewhat related to the constructive fraud situation is the problem that arose in
Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 526 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where the husband designated his second wife as

beneficiary of an insurance policy on his life.

The original beneficiaries, designated

pursuant to a property settlement in dissolution of the first marriage, were children of
the insured's first marriage. The appellate court held that, terms of the insurance policy
notwithstanding, the husband could not alter the prior obligation to his children.

161. 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975).
162. 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974), noted in 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 933 (1975).
163. 513 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1974).
164. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (1975). For the draftsmen's plan see McKnight,
Commentary on the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEx. TEcH L. REV. 281, 358-61
(1974); McSwain, Revision of Marital Property Rights Statutes, 31 Tux. B.J. 1013
(1968); McKnight, Recodification of Matrimonial Property Law, 29 TEx. B.J. 1000

(1966). For a more general treatment see McKnight, Texas Community Property
Law-Its Course of Development and Reform in ESSAYS IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY
PRESENTED TO CLYDE EMERY 30, 48-54 (Southern Methodist University 1975).
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interests subject to sole mangement. Cockerham involved two distinct
business operations. One was a dairy operated by the husband on property
owned as a tenancy in common shared by his separate estate and the
community. 16 5 The other business was a dress shop which was operated by
the wife, but which was initially financed with community funds supplied by
the husband. It was the wife's practice, acquiesced in by her husband, to
write checks for dress shop purchases on her husband's account, and the
husband had on two occasions paid dress shop debts himself. With respect
to the dairy, the court concluded that it was subject to joint management
because it was operated in part on jointly managed community property
which was so classified because the spouses had jointly acquired it. The
husband, therefore, would not have owned the business if he had been
single. The necessary implication is that the husband would not have been
the sole owner of the dairy business if he had been single. With respect to
the dress shop, there was evidence of actual use of the resources controlled
by the husband in the wife's business venture as well as the appearance of
his being a principal in its activities. Thus, the supreme court seems to
conclude that management of community property is governed primarily
by section 5.22(c) unless subsections (a) or (b) are clearly applicable;
whereas the draftsmen intended that subsection (c) be applicable only
when subsections (a) or (b) are clearly inapplicable. The decision in
Cockerham requires that clients be advised as to the manner of conducting
their business affairs so that the business operations of each client-spouse will
not be considered joint ventures of the spouses. 16 6 As a primary rule,
property to be used for business purposes should be acquired by and in the
name of the spouse who intends to use it. The spouse acquiring property in
his or her sole behalf should be further advised to insulate his or her business
dealings from those of the other spouse through the use of funds subject to
the sole management of that spouse. If the husband, for example, should
want to provide capital for his wife, a partition of community property or a
gift to the wife would provide separate property for such a purpose. The
profits of the wife's venture would be community property subject to her sole
management.
E. Liability of Marital Property
In addition to the questions concerning characterization and management
of marital property, the supreme court in Cockerhaml6 7 spoke to the issue
of marital property liability. The husband and wife were engaged in distinct
and respective businesses: the husband's dairy and the wife's dress shop. As
pointed out above,' 68 the dairy business constituted jointly managed com165. See notes 77-82 supra and accompanying text.
166. The pitfalls of such activities, separate liability of both "venturers," is discussed
in notes 170-72 infra and accompanying text. Magee, Marital Property Rights Under
the Texas Family Code and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30 PERS. FINANCE L.Q.
Winter 1975, at 14, examines the law principally from the point of view of those who
lend money to spouses with or without security.
167. 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975), discussed in notes 77-82 supra and accompanying
text (characterization) and notes 161-66 supra and accompanying text (management).
168. See notes 77-82 supra and accompanying text.
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munity property because the dairy was located in part on land jointly
acquired and held by the spouses. The dress shop was jointly managed
community property because it had been the object of managerial activities
of each spouse. 109 For purposes of liability, however, Cockerham is
essentially a case of holding-out and ratification within the law of agency.
The court held that the debts of the dress shop business were "joint
liabilities" of the spouses. With respect to the wife, she incurred the debts
directly; as to the husband, he allowed his wife to use his bank account in
paying her dress shop debts and on a few occasions paid debts himself or
acknowledged his indebtedness for them. Hence, the husband made the
wife's debts his own. Consequently, the dress shop debts were subject to
separate property as well as the jointly
satisfaction from the husband's
70
managed community property.'
With proper advice the results of Cockerham could easily have been
avoided. In the first place, there was no need for the wife's participation in
the acquisition of the dairy situs, which was crucial to the conclusion that the
dairy business was a jointly-managed community enterprise. Second, a
different conclusion would have been reached with respect to the dress shop
if the husband had documented the transfer of initial capital as a loan, and
had caused the wife to establish separate bank accounts. Further, if the
husband had avoided any apparent responsibility for the debts incurred by
his wife, no particular significance would have been attached to the fact that
the couple filed a joint federal income tax return and took deductions for
depreciation and losses with respect to the dress shop. The lesson of
Cockerham is simple. 17 1 If one spouse wishes to engage in business and the
only available capital is community property subject to the sole management
of the other spouse or subject to joint management of the spouses, the
spouses should be very cautious in structuring the business venture. In light
of the supreme court's opinion they should be advised of three possible
approaches: (1) a loan of community funds to be repaid from the separate
property of the debtor-spouse; (2) a gift to that spouse; or (3) a partition of
the community. Additionally, the non-involved spouse should be careful to
avoid any future involvment in the mangement of the business. If these
the adverse, unexpected effects of Cockerham can
simple rules are followed,
72
easily be avoided.'
169. See notes 165-66 supra and accompanying text.
170. If there had been solely managed community property of each spouse, it would
also have been liable. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(c) (1975).
171. The lesson is not, as is suggested by Rosenstein, Recent Developments in
Bankruptcy, 13 BuLL. OF THE SECTION ON CORP., BANKING & Bus. L. No. 3, Nov. 1975,
at 5, that the husband's prime sin of omission was his failure to participate in the wife's
bankruptcy proceeding.
172. By way of dictum in Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Tripp, 516 S.W.2d
256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ granted), the court emphasized that under
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(a) (1975) separate property of the wife is not liable for
debts contracted by the husband nor is income produced by her separate property. In the
latter regard, the court emphasizes the history of the rule by citing United States F. & G.
Co. v. Milk Prod. Ass'n, 383 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). See Comment, The Concept of Indissolubility: Separate Creditors and the
Community, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 263 (1975). See also Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage
Co., Inc., 526 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).

1976]

FAMILY LAW

In Short v. United States173 the Service asserted a tax lien against the
husband on community property subject to the wife's control and gratuitously
transferred by her while insolvent prior to the time the lien attached. The
property was clearly subject to tax liability, 174 and the donee failed to show
that the transfer was supported by consideration or that the transferor was
solvent. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that a spouse may not
wholly avoid future tax liability on income from a share of separate or
community property given outright to the other spouse. As has been pointed
out above, however, if the donor makes the gift in trust and specifies that the
income is payable to the beneficiary as his or her separate property, the
objective of tax savings may be achieved. 175 The Revenue Service has also
ruled 76 that with respect to a qualified employee benefit plan, a nonemployee's surviving spouse is subject to gift tax liability if the benefits of the
plan are paid to a third party beneficiary at the death of the employeespouse. Though a gift by an employee of his community property interest in
a qualified employee pension plan is not subject to gift taxes 77 and the nonemployee's surviving spouse's community interest in the plan is exempt from
estate taxes on the death of the employee, 78 the Internal Revenue Code is
silent concerning gift tax consequences of the non-employee's share distributed to a third person on the death of the employee. Not surprisingly, the
Revenue Service's ruling interprets the void in its favor.
Though a homestead is not immune from seizure for federal tax liability,' 79 state law has been liberally construed to preserve the home from the
satisfaction of other types of debt, provided the fact of homestead use is
adequately proved.' 80 In Vistron Corp. v. Winstead,'8 ' for example, the
debtor maintained a residential homestead in an incorporated town and
successfully claimed as his business homestead a two-and-one-half-acre tract
two-tenths of a mile beyond the city limits of the town, upon which he
conducted his business. Evidence indicated that there were other places of
business located along the highway beyond the premises of the debtor and
that the business property was, therefore, sufficiently within the urban
community of residence to establish a business homestead. The proexemption approach is also exemplified by the conclusion that one who has
failed to acquire a lien on homestead property by proper joinder of the
spouses in granting the lien cannot assert a right of subrogation to the
173. 395 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Tex. 1975).

174. See Broday v. United States, 455 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1972), discussed in

McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 42
(1973).

With respect to the innocent spouse defense for income tax liability under INT. REV.
§ 6013 see Allen v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1975);
Stroman v. McCanless, 391 F. Supp. 1344 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
175. McFarland v. Campbell, 213 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1954).
CODE OF 1954,

176. Rev. Rul. 75-240, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 25, at 16.
177. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2517(a). Id. § 2039(c) provides for a similar estate
tax exclusion.
178. Id.§ 2039(d).
179. See Stroman v. McCanless, 391 F. Supp. 1344 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
180. See Bouldin v. Woosley, 525 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no
writ).
181. 521 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
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position of the taxing authorities after paying taxes assessed against the
property.' 1 2 The attorney general has also expressed 'the opinion that
counties may not deprive a person over sixty-five of a special ad valorem tax
exemption because he has failed to make an assertion of homestead claim
before a certain date.' 83 On the other hand, in Valley Bank of Nevada v.
Skeen' 8 4 a federal district court restrictively construed the homestead exemption. A creditor sought to enforce a judgment lien against property
which had been acquired as a homestead when the exemption with respect to
the lot was $5,000. The lien fixed on the property after the exempt amount
had been raised to $10,000 in late 1969.185 At all times until the judgment
creditor's lien fixed on the property the value of the lot was $13,000, and
when the creditor sought to foreclose its lien the value of the lot was
$40,000. It was concluded in Hoffman v. Love 186 that when a homestead
is established on land worth more than the exempt maximum and the value
of the land continues to appreciate thereafter, the exempt portion is in the
same ratio to the ground value at any relevant time as was the ratio of the
exempt amount to the actual value at the time of homestead designation.
Until the time of the increase in the homestead exemption, therefore, the
homestead exemption would be in the ratio of 5 to 13. The homestead
claimant asserted that in late 1969 the ratio would have changed to 10 to 13.
In Skeen the court, relying on the precedent of Linch v. Broad,187 which
rests in turn on McLane v. Paschal,88 concluded that the prior ratio was, in
effect, permanently fixed. Though the result is contrary to the liberal
construction rule,' 8 9 the decision is consistent with both the authority relied
upon and the applicable constitutional language: "It]he homestead in a city
. . . shall consist of lot, or lots, not to exceed in value Ten Thousand
Dollars, at the time of their designation as the homestead .... -10

This

interpretation can nevertheless produce anomalous results. For example,
suppose that A and B are both purchasers of identical adjacent homes on
comparable lots in the same urban housing development. Both lots were
worth $15,000 when purchased with identical improvement. If A bought in
mid-1969 and B bought in early 1970 and each took up residence immediately upon purchase, the ratio of exempt to the non-exempt portion of A's lot
is one-half that of B's. In Skeen the homestead claimant, conceding that the
1969 amendment did not have retroactive effect, argued that the relevant
date for purposes of the lien is that on which the adverse right attached, and
that at that time the exemption stood at $10,000. The court responded that
182. Great Eastern Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 526 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
183. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. OP. No. H-364 (1974). See also id. No. H-309.
184. 401 F.Supp. 139 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
185. The date on which the constitutional amendment became effective issubject to
some dispute. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J.
67, 93 (1975), and authorities there cited.
186. 494 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ ref'd n.r.e., 499 S.W.2d 295
(Tex. 1973) (per curiam), noted in 5 Tax. TECH L. REV. 865 (1974).
187. 70 Tex. 92, 6 S.W.751 (1888).
188. 62 Tex. 102 (1884).
189. See Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 19 S.W.2d 35 (1929).
190. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (emphasis added).
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it would then seem appropriate to consider the value of the property at that
time. The suggestion is reasonable but difficult to reconcile with the constitutional language, unless as a matter of law the claimant is allowed to make a
notional redesignation of his homestead (without prejudice to the rights of
pre-existing lien holders, of course) at the date of the increase in the
exemption. But though the results may be appealing, the artificiality of the
argument is patent.' 0 '

II. CHILDREN
A.

Status

Several disputes arose concerning the status of minors as persons. In
other jurisdictions a federal court has held that a juvenile curfew ordinance is

a reasonable exercise of local police power, 192 while another has held that
minors may not be deprived of the right to purchase contraceptives. 193 For
purposes of suit in Texas a minor with a guardian is a proper party;

94

it is

well settled that a judgment taken against a minor without a guardian is
merely voidable rather than void.' 9 5 The attorney general has expressed
the view that as a consequence of the Emancipation Act of 1973196 students

have statutory authority to choose their place of residence' 9 7 and that
minors may acquire permits to operate taxicabs. 198
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court invalidated the Texas rule
denying illegitimate children a judicially enforceable right to support from
their natural fathers. 199 Since the paternity suit is novel ,to most Texas
lawyers and judges, some initial misunderstandings are to be expected. In
Williams v. Stewart200 a mother sought a writ of mandamus to compel a
191. The claimant further contended that in order to satisfy the creditor, the court
can only order sale of the non-exempt undivided interest. This contention was rejected
out of hand. Whiteman v. Burkey, 115 Tex. 400, 282 S.W. 788 (1926). "Although the
courts favor allowing a defendant to pay the excess value without resorting to sale of the
entire property and division of the proceeds . . . the court is empowered to order the
latter procedure if a defendant is unable to make up the deficiency." 401 F. Supp. at
140.
192. Bykofsky v. Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975); cf. People v.
Chambers, 335 N.E.2d 612 (Ill. App. 1975), in which a curfew law requiring that all
persons under 18 be off the street by 11 o'clock on weekdays and midnight on weekends
was declared unconstitutional as a needless infringement on minors' freedom of travel
and rights of free speech, association, assembly, and religion.
193. Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See
generally Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The
Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HAv. L. REV. 1001 (1975).
194. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Williams, 522 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
195. Wallis v. Stuart, 92 Tex. 568, 50 S.W. 567 (1899).
196.

TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5923b (Supp. 1975-76).

197. See, e.g., TEx. Arr'Y GEN. Op.No. H-713 (1975).
198. Id. No. H-687.
199. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). See also Annot., Supreme Court's View
as to the Status and the Rights of Illegitimate Children, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1228 (1975);
Massey v. Weinberger, 397 F. Supp. 817 (D. Md. 1975) (social security); Wood v.
Paulus, 524 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(meaning of "lawfully begotten children" in will); Annot., Insurance: Term "Children"
as Used in Beneficiary Clause of Life Insurance Policy as Including Illegitimate Child,
62A.L.R.3d 1329 (1975).
200. 525 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
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domestic relations court to take jurisdiction of her claim for child support
from the alleged father. The court of civil appeals held that the domestic
relations court had jurisdiction of the paternity suit but concluded that the
petitioner should proceed by appeal. The Paternity Act of 1975201 provides
that an action brought under it must be commenced within one year of the
birth of the child. 20 2 A similar limitation has been elsewhere held unconsti20 3
tutional as a violation of the equal protection clause.
Determination of paternity has long presented difficult problems of
proof. 20 4 In Guerra v. DeLuna20 5 an admission of cohabitation was
treated as a hearsay exception. Evidence of some cohabitation, however,
will by no means establish cohabitation at time of conception. With respect
20 6
to disproof of paternity, the Texas Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis
disavowed Lord Mansfield's Rule2 0 7 in holding that either alleged parent may
20 8
testify as to non-access at the time of conception.
Other devices than a mother's suit to prove paternity have been employed
in attempts to achieve a parental relationship. In one instance 20 9 a man
who asserted that he was the biological father of a child sought to adopt the
child. The parental rights of the husband and wife during whose marriage
the child was born had been terminated and a county agency was appointed
managing conservator. The appellate court held that the alleged father's
position was the same as that of any other person seeking to adopt a child,
and the trial court's finding that adoption of the child would not be in the
child's best interest was sustained. No proof was made that the petitioner
was in fact the child's father, and the court pointed out that the petitioner did
not seek custody as a discrete remedy. In a similar case 210 the alleged
father of an illegitimate child responded to a county agency's suit to
terminate the parent-child relationship between the child and mother by
filing a petition for voluntary legitimation. The trial court rejected the
alleged father's petition and terminated the rights of the mother and the
201. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.01-.09 (Supp. 1975-76). Henson v. Brown, 524
S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ), was a paternity suit brought prior
to the enactment of the Paternity Act of 1975. The court held that venue is properly laid
in the county where the child resides as in suits affecting the parent-child relationship
generally. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.04 (Supp. 1975-76). But the rule is otherwise under id. § 13.41.
202. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Supp. 1975-76).
203. Cessna v. Montgomery, 28 Ill. App. 3d 887, 329 N.E.2d 861 (1975). See also,
Jensen v. Voshell, 193 N.W.2d 86 (Iowa 1971); Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 685 (1974).

204. Proof of mother's prior chastity: Dewey v. Funk, 211 Kan. 54, 505 P.2d 722
(1973); Annot. 59 A.L.R.3d 659 (1974). Exhibition of child: Glascock v. Anderson,
83 N.M. 725, 497 P.2d 727 (1972); Annot. 55 A.L.R.3d 1087 (1974). See generally
Holz, The Trial of a Paternity Case, 50 MAQ. L. REv. 450 (1967).
205. 526 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
206. 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975).

207. Goodright ex dem. Stevens v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B.
1777).
208. Accord, Commonwealth ex rel. Savruk v. Derby, 344 A.2d 624 (Pa. 1975). See
generally Comment, Presumptions of Legitimacy in Texas, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 340
(1975); Commonwealth ex rel. Leider v. Leider, 434 Pa. 293, 254 A.2d 306 (1969);
Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 212 (1973). Regarding "non-access" due to the alleged father's
sterility, see S. v. S., 520 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. App. 1975).

209. Furlow v. Harris County Child Welfare Unit, 527 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
210. In re K, 520 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ granted).
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alleged father. The mother had executed an irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment 21I accompanied by an affidavit of status. 212 The alleged father's petition failed because he failed to show that the witnesses to his
affidavit were credible adults, 21 3 and his statement of paternity was not filed
before the petition for legitimation. With respect to the latter point, the
court appears to be finding a requirement in the statute not supplied by the
legislature. However, from the evidence adduced, the court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to consent to the alleged father's petition for
2 14
legitimation.
In termination proceedings affecting a resident parent there must be
service of process to give the court power to terminate parental rights 216
unless the parent affected appears voluntarily. 216 The applicable law is
that of chapter 15 of the Family Code, enacted in 1973,217 as amended in
1975.218 There is a presumption that the best interest of the child will be
served by its being in the care of its parent, and the burden of rebutting this
presumption is upon the one who asserts that parental responsibility should
reside with another. The burden may be met without showing that the
parent is unfit as long as the facts establish that the parent has committed
one of the acts justifying termination of parental rights 219 and termination is
in the best interest of the child. 220 In D.F. v. State221 Justice Peden
commented that termination of the parent-child relationship should not
necessarily result from a parent's
lack of intelligence or training, illness, or misfortune [by which the
parent] is unable to provide a desirable degree of physical care and
support for his or her children . . . but a lack of adequate love and
affection may be evidenced by the parent's deliberate neglect in failing
222
to provide a reasonable measure of care and comfort for the child.
211. TEx.

FAM. CODE

ANN. § 15.03 (Supp. 1975-76).

212. Id. § 15.04 (1975).

213. Id. § 13.22 (Supp. 1975-76), amending ch. 543, § 1, [1973] Tex. Laws 1421.
214. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.21 (1975-76).

215. Keith v. Spratlan, 530 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ).

216. Toler v. Travis County Child Welfare Unit, 520 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Austin 1975, no writ). In two instances appellate courts were called on to point out that
when both parents' rights are sought to be terminated, one has no standing to raise issues
on appeal for the sole purpose of protecting the other. Keith v. Spratlan, 530 S.W.2d
348 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); D.F. v. State, 525 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.

Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1975, no writ).
217. The Act of June 15, 1973, ch. 543, [1973] Tex. Laws 1411, took effect Jan. 1,
1974, but is also applicable to cases commenced prior to that date unless applicability
would not be feasible or would work injustice. Id. § 4, at 1459. See Ex parte Collins,

No. 6453 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso July 9, 1975, no writ); D.F. v. State, 525 S.W.2d
933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ); Floyd v. Seward, 520 S.W.2d
873 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ).
218. Act of June 19, 1975, ch. 476, [1975] Tex. Laws 1253 (effective Sept. 1, 1975).
219. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (1975). This section was amended in 1975 by

the addition of new subsections (1)(C) and (1)(K) and some new language in
subsection (1) (H) renumbered as (1) (J).
220. In re R.D.P., 526 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ). Even if
the parent is guilty of one of the acts justifying termination, the child's best interest may
not be served by termination. White v. Chamberlain, 525 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1975, no writ).
221. 525 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. -Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
222. Id. at 940. See also In re Salinas, 530 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1975, no writ); Kennedy v. Becker, 530 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1975, no writ).
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Regarding failure to support for the requisite statutory period, the Texas
Supreme Court held in Cawley v. A Jums 2 23 that a resumption of substantial
support within the period tolls the period of non-support. In one later
case 22 4 the court distinguished Cawley when support was of an insignificant
amount. In Wiley v. Spratlan225 another court drew a distinction between
the pre-1974 law under which Cawley was decided and the provisions of the
Family Code, 226 under which the court found a wider judicial discretion.
In termination cases, particularly those to which a state agency is a party,
much of the evidence is developed through a social study made by a public
agency at the behest of the court. 227 Though the Family Code 228 provides
that the report of the social study "shall be made a part of the record of the
suit," it is also provided that -the rules of evidence apply in such suits as in
other civil cases 229 and that the person making such report is subject to
direct and cross-examination. 230 Reading these provisions together it is
concluded that a social study report not introduced as evidence cannot be the
23 1
basis of the court's findings.
Termination of parental rights and adoption are distinct concepts within
the provisions of the Family Code, 232 often applied in separate proceedings. 233 As a result of this development there are relatively few disputes
with respect to the adoption process. 234 One dispute did arise with respect
to the rights of the parents of a deceased parent. In Deweese v.
Crawford235 the court considered the impact of section 14.03(d) of the
Family Code2 36 on a stepfather adoption adjudicated prior to January 1,
1974. Section 14.03(d) provides that a court may grant "reasonable
visitation rights to maternal or paternal grandparents." The court concluded
that the parents of the children's deceased father were not "parental
grandparents" within the meaning of the statute, since under statutory law at
the time of the adoption "all legal relationships and all rights and duties
between such [adopted] child and its natural parents [except rights of
inheritance] shall cease. ' '237 In Deweese the trial court refused to appoint
223. 518 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1975).
224. Coffey v. Lechler, 523 S.W. 762 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); cf. Floyd v. Seward, 520 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ).
225. 529 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ granted).
226. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(1)(E) (1975), renumbered as § 15.02(I)(F)
(Supp. 1975-76).
227. Id. § 11.12 (1975). In an adoption proceeding the social study is mandatory.
Id. § 11.12(b).
228. Id. § 11.12(d).
229. Id. §§ 11.14(e), 11.15.
230. Id. § 11.14(f).
231. D.F. v. State, 525 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1975,
no writ); Magallon v. Texas, 523 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1975, no writ).
232. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. chs. 15, 16 (1975), as amended, (Supp. 1975-76).
233. The proceedings may, however, be joined under id. § 16.03 (1975). See id. §
16.08 (Supp. 1975-76).
234. The applicability of the doctrine of adoption by estoppel, however, tends to
expand. Devoroex v. Nelson, 529 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. 1975), aff'g 517 S.W.2d 658 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 99 (1975).
235. 520 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
236. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(d) (1975).
237. Ch. 249, § 1, [1951] Tex. Laws 388. There are correlative provisions in TEx.
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the adoptive father and actual mother as managing conservators as they had
prayed. In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court
merely said the power to appoint managing conservators is discretionary. 238
In this instance such an appointment would have been pointless since parents
who have not been appointed managing conservators have the same powers
as those who have been so appointed. 239
B.

Conservatorship

Although proposals are put forward that would significantly alter traditional rules, 240 the underlying rule which governs a child's relationship with
its parents on the one hand, and third persons on the other, provides that the
parent is entitled to the services of the child. Any interference with the
child's well-being is deemed an interference with a right of the parent. 241
Parental neglect which causes injury to the child is attributable to the
parent, 242 and the parent may be answerable for damage intentionally 243 or
negligently caused by a child. Prior to 1957244 a Texas parent was liable
for a tort committed by a child if the parent negligently permitted conduct
likely to cause injury, directed 'the child to commit the injury, or an actual
agency relationship between the parent and the child had given rise to the
injury. Legislation of 1957 provided for parental liability to the extent of
damages of up to $300 for the willful conduct of a child between the ages of
ten and eighteen. This act was amended in 1965245 to increase the amount
of damages recoverable to $5,000. On January 1, 1974, the rule was
incorporated in the Family Code2 46 and the minimum age was raised to
247
twelve.
In Aetna Insurance Co. v. Richardelle248 a child of eleven committed

willful damage prior to January 1, 1974, but suit was brought after that date.
The statutory right of action had, therefore, been abolished by the legislature
after a right of action had accrued. The court held that relief could not be
granted under the repealed statute when the legislature failed to provide for
See Smith, Commentary to Texas Family Code, Title
2, 5 TEx. TECH L. REV. 389, 454 (1974). If the grandparent should be domiciled in a
jurisdiction that requires mention of descendants of deceased children in order to exclude
their claims as pretermitted heirs, a nice question would arise as to the status of actual
FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.09 (1975).

Texas grandchildren adopted by a stepparent.
238. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(a) (1975).
239. Compare id. §§ 12.04, 14.02(a).
240. See H. FOSTER, A BILL OF RiHTs FOR CHILDREN (1974).
241. See, e.g., TEx. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. H-600 (1975), to the effect that a minor
may volunteer to donate blood with parental consent. See also Comment, Consent to
the Medical Treatment of a Minor under the Family Code, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 319
(1975).
242. See Meadows v. Gregory, 484 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1972); Annot., Permitting Child
To Walk to School Unattended is Contributory Negligence of Parents in Action for
Death of Child, 62 A.L.R.3d 541 (1975)'.
243. See Parsons v. Smithey, 109 Ariz. 49, 504 P.2d 1272 (1973); Annot., Parents'
Liability for Injury or Damage Intentionally Inflicted by Minor Child, 54 A.L.R.3d 974
(1974).
244. Ch. 320, § 1, [1957] Tex. Laws 783.
245. Ch. 217, § 1, [1965] Tex. Laws 430.
246. Ch. 543, § 1, [1973] Tex Laws 1411.
247. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.01 (1975).
248. 528 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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doctrine of parental immunity is still operative in Texas with respect to
causes of action that might be brought by a child against a parent, the
250
principle does not operate to protect the parent's employer from liability.
Texas courts have generally asserted jurisdiction in matters involving
children if the child is domiciled or physically present in the state. 2 5 1 But if

a person is not subject to the court's in personam jurisdiction, it is generally
concluded that he is not bound by the decree. 25 2 In response to a need for
expansion of personal jurisdiction the legislature enacted section 11.051 of
the Family Code in 1975.253 This section provides for personal jurisdiction
over absent persons if (1) the child was conceived in Texas and the person
over whom jurisdiction is sought is a parent or probable father of the child,
(2) the person has permitted or directed an act which results in the child's
residing in Texas, (3) the person has resided in Texas with the child, or (4)
the state or federal constitutions would not be offended by exercise of
jurisdiction over the person. 2 54 Since the breadth of the language of the
first and third grounds may be read to cover inappropriate situations for
exercising jurisdiction, the courts should be wary of a literal interpretation of
the statute in every instance. Under the first ground, for example, jurisdiction may be asserted if .the child is conceived by a couple on a brief visit to
Texas, though the parent over whom jurisdiction is sought has no later
contact with the state and has no responsibility for the child's being here.2 55
Under the first or third grounds jurisdiction of the absent person may be
asserted when that person has left the state with the child, even if the child is
not determined to be domiciled in Texas and has not been removed from
Texas in anticipation of litigation. 'In this instance, the law of another state
may be more appropriate to resolve the disputes involved in the parent-child
relationship. 256 It is also worthy of note that although section 3.26(b)
provides that a court acquiring jurisdiction of an inter-spousal dispute also
acquires jurisdiction over a suit affecting the parent-child relationship under
249. Id. at 286.

With respect to non-liability of an insured parent for damages

resulting from unauthorized use of child's insured automobile, see Government Employee's Ins. Co. v. Edelman, 524 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd

n.r.e.).
250. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975).
251. Ex parte Birmingham, 150 Tex. 595, 244 S.W.2d 977 (1952); cf. Hinds v.
Hinds, 491 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ), discussed in

McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 93 (1974).
252. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); see Sampson, Long-Arm Jurisdiction

Marries the Texas Family Code, 38 T-x. BJ. 1023 (1975).

See also Comment, State

Court Jurisdiction: The Long-Arm Reaches Domestic Relations Cases, 6 TEx. TECH L.
REV. 1021 (1975); Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73

COLUM. L. REV. 289 (1973).
253. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Supp. 1975-76). The principle purpose of the
section is "to enlarge the protection of Texas families against those who seek to avoid
their obligations by staying outside of this state when family difficulties have made legal
action necessary."

Smith, 1975 Amendments to Titles I and 2 of Texas Family Code,

Nov. 1975, at 7. See also McKnight, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. LJ. 67, 103 (1975).
254. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Supp. 1975-76).
255. In that instance the principal draftsman of the statute suggests that "[a] court
should refuse to apply the long-arm [statute] on due process grounds." Sampson, supra
note 252, at 1028.
256. Id. at 1031.
STATE BAR SECTION REPORT: FAMILY LAW,
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section 11.051, there are instances when an independent spousal dispute
may not be subject to a court's jurisdiction though the court is competent to
2 57
deal with disputes involving the parent-child relationship.
The great bulk of litigation involving the parent-child relationship involves
conservatorship 258 and the duty 'to support. Disputes with respect to
conservatorship arising out of cases adjudicated before January 1, 1974, are
treated as new cases under the Family Code.2 59 After January 1, 1974, the

court in which a suit involving the parent-child relationship is first filed
maintains continuing jurisdiction of subsequent disputes concerning the
parent-child relationship, at least until the child's adoption causes a new
parent-child relationship. 260 The court may, however, transfer a dispute to
a court in another county for purposes of venue 261 or for the convenience of
parties or witnesses. Such interlocutory orders of the courts are unappeal26 2
able.
If a party who has been personally served appears for a temporary
hearing before the answer date and informs the court orally of his intentions
to contest jurisdiction, he has not thereby "answered" as a matter of law, and
his representation has no effect on the subsequent course of the proceeding.

Without further participation he can make no complaint concerning the
judgment rendered against him. 2 63 Nor should those intervening in a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship expect to be granted a protracted
continuance, especially if they had become aware of the suit months before
intervening.2 64 A jury trial is waived by a party who does not demand it
prior to hearing. 265 If the trial court orders a report of the welfare
department but proceeds to enter an order of conservatorship before receiv257. Id.
258. See generally Ragland, Some Thoughts on Child Custody Litigation, 10 TRIAL
LAw. F., July-Sept. 1975, at 30.
259. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 99100 (1975), and authorities there cited; In re Martinez, 522 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1975, no writ). For what may be the last example of the cumbersome preJanuary 1, 1974, rules, see Hawkins v. Hawkins, 515 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1974, writ dism'd). Cases brought prior to Jan. 1, 1974, and sub judice
thereafter, are subject to the provisions of the Family Code unless their application
"would not be feasible or would work injustice." Act of June 15, 1973, ch. 543, § 4,
[1973] Tex. Laws 1459.
260. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.05(a), (b) (1975). Section 11.05 was clarified by
amendment in 1975 to provide for exigencies of a termination proceeding inter alia. Id.
§ 11.05(d) (Supp. 1975-76). Section 11.07 was also clarified with respect to the filing
of a petition for further action that is not a motion to modify under § 14.08. Id. § 11.07
The legislature also added § 11.071 to provide a means for
(Supp. 1975-76).
identifying the court of continuing jurisdiction. Id. § 11.071.
261. Id. 99 11.06(a), (b) (1975).
262. Id. §§ 11.06(c), (f). See Guillory v. Davis, 530 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1975, no writ). In 1975 § 11.06 was amended by the addition of subsection
(g) to clarify the situation when two or more children were the subjects of the parentchild relationship and a subsequent dispute arises with respect to only one of them. TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(g) (Supp. 1975-76).
263. Brown v. Brown, 521 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975,
no writ).
264. Sralla v. Sralla, 524 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
265. Garcia v. Garcia, 526 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). In Lipshy v. Lipshy, 525 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ
dism'd), the court reiterated the holding in Perkins v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.
1974), that if parties to a suit concerning conservatorship have interests that are not
antagonistic, they are not entitled to separate peremptory jury challenges.
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ing the report, the suit ceases to be one in which a study has been ordered
and no party has cognizable rights therein. 266 If a public entity is neither
an actual nor a nominal party in the suit, the court has no authority to order
267
payment of fees for a guardian ad litem from public funds.
Once an appeal from an order of the trial court is filed, the trial court may
not disturb the status quo of that appeal. In Blackmon v. Blackmon 2 s the
court pointed out that section 11.19(c) of the Family Code269 "pertains
only to the suspension of orders and decrees which are the subject matter
of an existing appeal [and] . . . does not . . .provide a basis for the

suspension of an order which is subsequently entered in -the same proceeding,
even though the lower court may have lacked authority to enter such an
order. '2 70 This section may also anticipate a suspension prior to appeal
rather than while the appeal is pending. If objection is not raised to the
court's failure to record an interview in chambers with minor children, any
error therein is waived. 271 Testimony from a prior hearing on the same
matter may be considered by a court in its later disposition of a dispute
27 2
between the same parties.
In a proceeding to appoint a managing conservator the primary consideration is the best interest of the child. The sex of the parent is only one of the
many factors that the court must consider. 273 The finder of fact must make
this determination. The wishes of the child are not given controlling effect,
nor is an undertaking between parents in a divorce settlement agreement that
the child may choose his parental custodian after reaching a particular
age. 274 In a proceeding to modify conservatorship the burden of proof is
266. Brown v. Brown, 521 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975,
no writ). For a discussion of English practices with respect to welfare reform and the
pros and cons of openness versus secrecy, see Murch, Divorce Court Welfare ReportsShould Parents See Them?, 125 NEW L.J. 736 (1975). See also I. v. I., 523 S.W.2d 103

(Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Annot., Right, in Child Custody Proceedings, To Cross Examine
Investigating Officer Whose Report is used by Court in Its Decision, 59 A.L.R.3d 1337

(1974).
267. County of Dallas v. Gibbs, 525 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. 1975).
268. 525 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, no writ).
269. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.19(C) (1975).
270. 525 S.W.2d at 713.
271. Wilkinson v. Evans, 515 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (1975).
272. Jones v. Jones, 525 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ). See
also Briley v. Brown, 521 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
273. Adams v. Adams, 519 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ). In

a recent much publicized Dallas case a jury was called upon to make this determination
as between a heterosexual father and a homosexual mother. Risher v. Risher, 107

TIME,

Jan. 12, 1976, at 54; See also In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1974).
274. Radtke v. Radtke, 521 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975,

no writ); cf. In re Carrigan, 517 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ),
with respect to an infant's selection of a guardian under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §
118(b) (1956).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (1975) as passed in 1973 was drafted with the
presupposition that the section would be applied by the court sitting without a jury (as §

11.13(b) was originally drafted) with a jury verdict as "advisory only."

On several

occasions the Council of the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Texas in 1974

discussed amendment of § 11.13(b) and the relevance of TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 to it. The
reference added in 1975 is with respect to non-jury cases. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
14.07(c) (Supp. 1975-76).
A New York court suggests that wishes of children are relevant to a change of custody
instituted by the custodian who desires a change in career that would be hindered by
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upon the movant to show changed circumstances either with respect to

managing 275 or possessory conservatorship. 27 With respect to modification, the trial court may not refuse to consider the motion or refuse to take
action concerning a prior order of conservatorship, even within one year,
when it is alleged that the present environment of the child endangers the
child's physical health and impairs the child's emotional development. 277 A
writ of habeas corpus is not a proper means of initiating a contest with
respect to conservatorship (as opposed to enforcing obedience of an existing
order), 278 nor is a motion for contempt to be used as a vehicle for changing
27 9
rights of managing or possessory conservatorship.
C.

Support

A number of jurisdictional matters may be put aside without extensive
comment because their subject matter is in all likelihood non-recurrent as a
result of the applicability of new law. 28 0 Moreover, the breadth of the 1975
long-arm statute 2 8 ' will enhance recourse to substituted service in situations

where the new law is applicable.

In Ex parte Limoges 282 the husband was

served by publication in a child support case after he had left the state.
continued conservatorship of that parent-in that instance a mother who desired to join
the army. LaRosa v. LaRosa, 373 N.Y.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
275. Penshorn v. Penshorn, 527 S.W.2d 516.(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no
writ); In re Y, 516 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Becerra v. Garibaldo, 526 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). See generally Comment, Child Custody Modification and the Family Code, 27
BAYLOR L. REv. 725 (1975).
276. Howard v. Pullicino, 519 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
The court stressed that since the petitioner had prevailed in the trial court but failed to
file a brief on appeal, the losing respondent's statement of the record would be accepted
by the court as a correct statement of facts without resort to the trial court's statement of
facts or the record. TEX. R. Civ. P. 419.
277. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(d) (1975); DeLeon v. Perriman, 530 S.W.2d
174 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ). A writ of mandamus will issue to
require the court to act. The 1975 amendment to § 14.08 provides that modification of
conservatorship may be based on materially changed circumstances of the child or
parent. Each party whose rights may be affected is entitled to 30 days' notice. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.08(b), (c) (Supp. 1975-76).
278. Ainsworth v. Homes of St. Mark, 530 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
279. Martin v. Martin, 519 S.W.2d 900, 523 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1975, no writ). The writ of habeas corpus may be used to enforce a valid
foreign judgment adjudicating conservatorship as a domestic one. Russell v. McMurtrey,
526 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Seaberg v.
Brogunier, 515 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), but the
court's dictum with respect to changed conditions is beside the point. Cf. Clayton v.
Newton, 524 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ), which deals with
a void foreign order. But see Follak v. Brown, 530 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1975, no writ).
280. In Clewis v. Clewis, 519 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ), the
initial order for support was entered in 1970 and a motion to modify that order was
made in 1972. Since the hearing was apparently before Jan. 1, 1974, the law in effect at
that time was applicable. If the matter had been under consideration by the trial court
after that time, the new law of that date would be applicable unless its application
"would not be feasible or would work injustice." Ch. 543, § 4(a), [1973] Tex. Laws
1459. See Howard v. Pullicino, 519 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no
writ); Seaberg. v. Brogunier, 515 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
281. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Supp. 1975-76).
282. 526 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
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Having been ordered to make support payments, he was jailed for contempt
for failure to do so upon his later return to the state. His attack on the
judgment, however, was sustained for lack of in personam jurisdiction. Cases

of this sort are unlikely to occur in the future, but in instances when the longarm statute may be inapplicable a court must now be more wary of false
statements with respect to substituted service than before.

Charvis v. Charvis288 stemmed from a suit for child support commenced
28 4
in Louisiana under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
In a Texas divorce action the court had found that there were no children of
the marriage, and in a subsequent suit for child support the father asserted
the earlier judgment as a bar. The court held, however, that the judgment
was not res judicata as to the child whose right of support is independent of
the suit for divorce. 28 5 In the trial of a child support case a record should be
made as required by statute, 280 but if a record is not made and no objection
is made at the trial, fundamental error is not necessarily committed. 287
Although each parent has an equal statutory duty to support his or her
minor children, 28 8 the burden need not be discharged by mathematically

equal contributions, nor does the Texas Bill of Rights require this result in its
provision that "[e]quality under the law shall not be denied . . .because
of sex . .. -"289 The father's duty to support an illegitimate child is also

perfectly clear.29 0 Termination of the parent-child relationship does not
absolve a parent from the duty of discharging past due support obligations.291 Templeton v. Templeton 29 2 presented an unusual situation of
apparent "dual paternity." The wife and her first husband were divorced in
283. 529 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ).
284. E.g., Tax. FAm. CODE ANN. §§ 21.01-.66 (1975).
285. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05 (1975). But after a mother has litigated facts
concerning delinquencies in child support payments, joinder of the child in a subsequent
suit will not allow her relitigation of the same matter. Gonzales v. Gonzales, 532 S.W.2d
382 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1975, writ filed).
286. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.14(d) (1975); TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2324
(Supp. 1975-76).
287. Ducoff v. Ducoff, 523 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975,
no writ). But the rule is otherwise when punishment may result from failure to comply
with the judgment. Schwartz v. Jefferson, 520 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1975).
288. TEX.FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (1975).
289. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a; Friedman v. Friedman, 521 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). Texas law makes no distinction between
male and female children for purposes of support, hence, Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975), will have no impact on Texas law in this regard. See also Annot., Liability of
Parent for Support of Child Institutionalized by Juvenile Court, 59 A.L.R.3d 636 (1974).
Liability may also extend beyond minority in the case of a child in need of special care.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(b) (1975). With respect to temporary child support see
Annot., Wife's Possession of Independent Means as Affecting her Right to Child Support
Pendente Lite, 60 A.L.R.3d 832 (1974).
290. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); In re R.V.M., 530 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1975, no writ). See Annot., Death of Putative Father as Precluding
Action for Determination of Paternity or for Child Support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188 (1974).
Attorney's fees may be awarded against the father as a necessary element of providing
support for an illegitimate child, In re R.V.M., 524 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1975, no writ), as in other cases of child support. Uhl v. Uhl, 524 S.W.2d 534 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ). The Texas Attorney General expressed the
opinion that county agencies may not charge a fee for handling child support payments.
TEx.Ar'Y GEN. Op. No. H-647 (1975).
291. Walker v. Sheaves, No. 15421 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio Jan. 14, 1976, no

writ).
292. 521 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1975, no writ).
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Oklahoma in 1965 and the husband was ordered to support their unborn
child. The wife and her second husband were married several days later,
and the child was born one month later. In the dissolution of his marriage
the second husband was ordered to support the child which was found to
have been born of his marriage to the mother. By a bill of review the
second husband sought unsuccessfully to deny paternity and terminate
support. It was clear from the record that if there was any failure to present
evidence to the divorce court, it was his own.
A court may entertain a motion to increase or reduce the amount ordered
for support within one year after the initial decree is entered. 293 In
considering a motion for reduction the court must, in any case, consider all
the facts adduced to sustain the motion; 294 however, changed conditions of
the child need not be shown. 295 The court "encourages parties . . . [to]
enter into written agreements containing provisions for support of the
children, subject to a determination by the court that such agreement is in
the best interest of the children.1 296 Absent an agreement between the parties, it is improper for the court to order a formula for support based on a
297
fixed percentage of a parent's gross income.
It is well settled that the proper remedy to review a contempt proceeding
is by a writ of habeas corpus, 2 98 and in the absence of commitment that
remedy is not available. 299 If the court ordering support has jurisdiction of
the parent ordered to pay, that party is not entitled to any notice of the
judgment as a matter of due process. 00 With respect to an order to show
cause why a parent should not be held in contempt, ten days notice before
trial is mandatory unless he appears earlier and is willing for the trial to be
held. 301 The person ordered to pay support cannot be held in contempt of
court for failure to comply with the order unless the order is certain and
unambiguous,3 0 2 nor should he be held in contempt if unable to comply with
the order in a situation not attributable to his own fault.3 0 3 -In Ex parte
293. TEx. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 14.08(d) (Supp. 1975-76). See In re Whittington, 521
S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ), decided under TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 14.08 as it stood before amendment in 1975, after which no difficulty of
statutory interpretation should arise.
294. Bell v. Sykes, 521 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no
writ).
295. Jackman v. Jackman, No. 15350 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio Apr. 30, 1975,
no writ).
296. Doss v. Doss, 521 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, no writ) (emphasis added); See McIntyre v. McFarland, 529 S.W.2d 857 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ). See also In re McLemore, 515 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1974, no writ), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 107-08 (1975).
297. Doss v. Doss, 521 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no
writ).
298. Holder v. Holder, 528 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ); Doss
v. Doss, 521 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
299. Doss v. Doss, 521 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no
writ).
300. Ex parte Loftin, 522 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ).
301. Ex parte Hoover, 520 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ).
302. Ex parte Dean, 529 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1975, no
writ); Ex parte Stroope, 524 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ); Ex
parte Hart, 520 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ); cf. Ex parte Miles,
525 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
303. Ex parte Hart, 524 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
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Hart30 4 a party was held in contempt, but the court provided for suspension
of its order upon his making certain payments ordered. The order went on
to provide that process would be issued for commitment on the recurrent
failure to comply with the court's order as verified by the affidavit of the
party to whom payment was ordered to be made. After the relator was
apprehended and jailed under this order, a writ of habeas corpus was
granted. Such a recommitment cannot properly be had without notice and
a hearing 305 at which a record of testimony must be made.80 6 A motion
for continuance by the party ordered to show cause should not be denied
arbitrarily. In Ex parte Blackmon '0 7 the father, who was the object of a
show-cause order, was the managing conservator of the child. The court's
denial of the father's motion, based on his failure or refusal to produce the
child, was held to be arbitrary under the circumstances.
Section 14.09(c) of the 'Family Code 308 gives the additional remedy of a
money judgment for enforcing arrearages of child support payments. In
Harrison v. Cox 3°° the court termed this a "procedural statute" which
applies to unpaid child support payments accrued before its effective date of
January 1, 1974. ' 10

In the case of a consent judgment or a property

settlement order dealing with child support, suit for arrearages may be
brought as on a contract.3 11 In Prewitt v. Smith,3 12 however, the court
held that trustees of a state retirement fund are not required to comply with
the provisions of section 14.05(c) of the Family Code3 13 for disbursement
of trust funds to satisfy support obligations of a trust beneficiary. Further,
the court held that such funds are part of the state employee's wages not
subject to garnishment. 314 The scope of effective garnishment of the
federal government under the Social Services Amendments of 19743 15 is as
3 16
yet undetermined..

304. Ex parte Hart, 520 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).

305. Id. Notice of a related cause will not suffice if both causes are not consolidated.
Blackmon v. Blackmon, 529 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no
writ).
306. Ex parte Hart, 520 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ); Ex
parte Thompson, 520 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
307. 529 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
308. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(c) (1975).
309. 524 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
310. The argument does not appear to have been made that retroactive effect of the
statute is improper because the original order was made in contemplation of enforcement
only by contempt. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw.
L.J. 67, 107-08 (1975).
311. Holder v. Holder, 528 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ).
There is no mention of TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(c) (1975). There is, however, a
brief but inconclusive discussion of the applicability of the statute of limitations to such
situations.
312. 528 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
313. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(c) (1975).
314. 528 S.W.2d at 896. In Addison v. Addison, 530 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Houston [lst Dist.] 1975, no writ), the court held that a state instrumentality is not
subject to garnishment for satisfaction of a judgment debt.
315. Pub. L. No. 93-647 (Jan. 4, 1975).
316. But see Boiling v. Howland, 398 F. Supp. 1313 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).

